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EXPERIMENTAL L-BAND SST SATELLITE
COMMUNICATIONS/SURVEILLANCE TERMINAL STUDY
VOLUME II: OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS STUDY
By James T. Burghart
The Boeing Company
SUMMARY
The development of the operational requirements performed as part of NASA/ERC
contract NAS 12-621 is presented for an L-band satellite system performing air traffic con-
trol (ATC) in the North Atlantic airlanes. The current oceanic ATC procedures and traffic
are considered and the increased benefits are given for extended ATC capabilities to a satel-
lite system for handling the expected airplane and passenger traffic growth through 1980.
The requirements for the ATC satellite system are developed for traffic in the open oceanic
area between latitudes 40 1 N and 600 N and longitudes 10 0
 
W and 50° W. Using the traffic
forecasts, specific surveillance and communications requirements are developed for use in
the aircraft terminal design.
The results of the surveillance requirements analysis show the potential reduction in
separation standards that can be achieved in terms of required aircraft position accuracies,
surveillance fix rate, and onboard navigation capability. The analysis was carried out using
results of surveillance and collision-risk mathematical models. It is concluded that a
system satisfying the derived requirements (including a 1-n.mi. surveillance accuracy) would
permit reduction of the current 120-n.mi. lane-separation standards to a goal of 30 n.mi. for
INS-equipped SST's and to a goal of 60 n.mi, for prese.it-day subsonic jet aircraft without
an INS.
The results of the communications requirements analysis show that a system pro-
viding six voice channels is adequate for the expected message loads associated with the
peak-hour busy-season traffic through 1980 for the North Atlantic area. The suggested im-
plementation is five channels for normal message interchange with moderate delay charac-
teristics and a zero-access-delay channel reserved for emergency transmissions.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The operational requirements are those system characteristics that are specified from
considerations of the needs of the system users as distinguished from the characteristics
that arise from the system design parameters. The study was limited to the needs of the
air traffic users. The degree to which the system meets or exceeds the requirements is a
measurement of the uscfulness of the system. The most important specifications for a
North Atlantic air traffic control (ATC) system are the communications capacity, the
position reporting accuracy, and the position reporting rate.
The study was performed as outlined in fig. 1. The details of each of the identified
analyses (airplane traffic, communications, and surveillance) are contained in the following
three sections. In addition, the impact of advanced technology such as the Automatic Flight
Management (AFM) program on these requirements is considered (Sec. 5.0). As a back-
ground, a discussion of today's North Atlantic ATC system is included as app. A. The
mathematical details of the requirements analyses are contained in the other appendixes.
A strong team effort was involved in conducting the overall study effort. The
operational requirements study reported in this volume is the result of significant contri-
butions by the following personnei:
Technical Direction .......... R. L. Erwin—Supervisor
J. T. Burghart
Airplane Traffic Analysis	 ...... W. H. Litzenberger
Passenger Crossings Forecasts .... Y. Aureille
Comr unications Analysis ...... S. R. Shah
Surveillance Analysis ........... D. M. Goodfellow
Collision Risk Analysis ......... J. T. Burghart
Computer Programming ....... J. M. Bedregal
H. F. Lee
J. Steigman
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2.0 AIRPLANE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
For purposes of this study, the peak instantaneous airborne count and the
busy-hour flow rate of airplanes into the system are the critical airplane traffic character-
istics to be determined. The peak instantaneous airborne count (IAC1 influences the
communications cat. - ; tv requirement. The flow rate determines the required separation
standards that are sE oy the positio-i reporting accuracy and rate.
2.1 Coverage Area
The area of primary interest is the North Atlantic region bounded approximately
by latitudes 40ON and 600N. The communications and navigation/surveillance problem
areas in this route are between the IOoW and 50OW meridians.
This North Atlantic region contains about 50% of the overocean traffic in the world.
Figures 2 and 3 are presented for comparative purposes. They show the weekly total of
schc,duled flights for all except North Atlantic (NAT) overocean flights. The NAT total is
approximately 2,000 flights. Two other heavily traveled routes shown are the U.S. West
Coast to Hawaii routes (19%) and the U.S. to Puerto Rico routes (15%). All other over-
ocean routes total approx ';nately 16`0 of the overocean traffic.
'.2 Passenger Crossing Projections
To calculate traffic output, it is necessary to determine the number of flights of
the various types of aircraft and their spatial distribution for peak conditions. To obtain
this for the 1975-1980 period, a prediction of passenger crossings is required. The passen-
ger demand is then converted to flight data using known and postulated rules about air-
plane load factors, passenger preferences (both for departure hours and airplane types), air-
plane delivery schedules and seating capacities, and cargo flights. The procedure is illus-
trated in fig. 4. A computer program has been developed to perform this calculation and
is described in app. B.
The greatest variation in the approach arises from the passenger projection input.
Predictions of future North Atlantic travel demand are subject to large uncertainties. The
usual approach is to examine past travel growth rates and postulate the future demand
based on these. A typical projection (from FAA data, ref. 1) is shown in table 1, the
first column.
The set of data shown in the other column is a more conservative traffic projection
based on a correlation of passenger flow and gross national product (GNP) between North
Atlantic country pairs. Gross national product growth has been more predictable in the
past, and for that reason is a useful oasis for projection.
2.3 North Atlantic Flight Projections
Because of the variable factors described, an attempt was made at determining the
possible spread of traffic obtainable. The high passenger input was combined with a
large supersonic preference factor to yield a maximum value. The minimum value was
obtained by using the lower passenger input with an optimistic jumbo-jet estimate. The
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TABLE 1.— PROJECTED NORTH ATLANTIC PASSENGER CROSSINGS
Year
Typical
forecast
(a)
Conservative
forecast
1975 14 024 000 8 454 000
1976 16 045 000 8 978 000
1977 18 371 000 9 515 000
1978 21 100 000 10 061 000
1979 24 000 000 10 621 000
1980 27 300 000 11 243 000
a 1978-1980 data were extrapolated from 1968-1977 forecast.
difference in passenger-carrying capacity between the supersonics and the jumbo jets,
combined with the different peaking characteristics of the traffic schedules, produces a
peak instantaneous airborne count variation that is not simply a function of the passenger
total.
Figure 5 shows tt:e results of this variation on the total daily flights. The assump-
tions used in obtaining these curves are detailed in app. B.
For the purpose of sizing the requirements of an ATC satellite, the 1980 estimates
were selected. Between the two estimates, a variation in the 1980 peak instantaneous air-
borne count in the communications gap (longitude IO oW to 50oW) of the following
was obtained:
Subsonic .............................. 	 55 to 68
Supersonic
	
............................	 21 to 63
Total	 ................................	 76 to 131
For purposes of the communications analysis, the higher IAC values were chosen.
This choice is in line with a conservative design philosophy. However, an analysis was also
performed for a minimum capability based on a low traffic estimate. The details of this
analysis are given in Sec. 3.0. The spatial distribution of the IAC is shown in table 2. A
preferred communications capability in the North Atlantic communications gap would
accommodate 131 airplanes.
The peak hourly subsonic and SST flow rate is used in the navigation analysis. By
calculating the high traffic estimates as in the previous IAC analysis, the peak flow rates
of table 3 were determined for 1980. These numbers formed the basis for the navigation
analysis input.
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TABLE 2. — NORTH ATLANTIC TRAFFIC SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION
Region Longitude
Number of airplanes
(a)
Subsonic Supersonic Total
Polar
(60° N to 900N) ---- 10 4 14
Principal
area
(40°N to 600 N)
0°W to 10°W 12 19 31
10°W to 20°W 20 16 36
20°W to 30°W 16 15 31
30°W to 40OW 16 16 32
40°W to 50°W 16 16 32
50OW to 60°W 14 37 51
60°W to 70°W 10 35 45
Other
(00 to 400 N) ---- 26 9 35
TOTAL 140 167 307
a For 1980; transoceanic traffic; peak busy summer day; instantaneous count
TABLE 3. — PEAK NORTH ATLANTIC FLOW RATES
Peak flow
Airplane type (a)
U.S. supersonic 36
Concorde 9
Subsonic 19
TOTAL	 64
a For peak flow hour, busy summer day (both ways)
131
Aircraft
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3.0 COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
To determine the satellite communications capacity requirements, the airplane
traffic load postulated in Sec. 2.0 is combined with the single-terminal message load. The
method chosen to accomplish this combination is a queueing-type computer simulation
model. The model generates message traffic based on peak-hour airplane loading and pos-
tulated message-type distributions. The output is the message delay statistics by category.
The details of the model can be found in app. C.
3.1 Single-Terminal Messages
Determination of North Atlantic single-terminal message characteristics for the
1980's is made by extrapolation of the present environment into a 1980 environment that
includes an ATC satellite capability. Single-terminal messages are those exchanged between
one aircraft and one ground terminal. Several operational concepts have been analyzed.
The following alternate concepts form the basis of the analysis:
(1) Present ATC procedures and voice transmission
(2) Position reporting rate increased from every lo o to every 5 0 of longitude
(3) Digital position reporting (one automatic report every 3 minutes)
(4) Ail-digital system with typical U.S. message load
(5) Surveillance capability added and present oceanic voice message load
(6) Surveillance capability added and typical U.S. voice message load
All concepts were analyzed for the high-traffic estimate, except the present ATC
procedures concept thr t was analyzed for both the high and low estimates.
From an operational viewpoint, the last concept is preferred. However, cost-benefit
considerations might dictate selection of a lesser capability A cost-benefit study is not with-
in the scope of this analysis, but preliminary results from a North Atlantic economics model
being developed at Boeing indicate that by 1980 the cost penalty paid by the air carriers due
to deviations from optimum tracks will support the preferred concept. The results shown
in ref. 2 are indicative of the trends.
The quantity and the type of messages currently transmitted in the North Atlantic
are limited by the communications capability. To project the communications load to
the 1980's, a method of determining the effect of improved capability on the load is
required. The method chosen is to assume that the U.S. communications environment is
representative of a future goal in the North Atlantic. Using this criterion, the following
list of message types was used as a base:
11
(1) First-Priority
(category 1) ...... Emergency
Conflict resolution
Other
(2) Air Traffic Control
(category 2) ...... Position reports
Clearance control
Vectoring
(3) Advisory
(category 3) ...... Airo-aft traffic advisories
Airport status
Weather
(4) Unclassified
(category 4) ...... Miscellaneous
Non-ATC
This list is ordered by importance to the ATC system. The messages fall naturally into the
four categories indicated. The queueing model described in app. C was developed to
include a priority scheme that selects the highest priority message awaiting transmission
and permits it access to the system first. The delay statistics as a function of these four
categories are the outputs of the model.
Table 4 presents a summary of the communications traffic model selected for
analysis. The numbers were determined as follows:
(l)	 Average Duration of Contact -- This parameter is defined as the total time
required to complete two-way voice transmission of the information con-
tained in each message. The format specifications of the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) were used. An average talking rate of
2.5 words per second was used. This is based on an analysis of U.S. domes-
tic ATC communications systems (ref. 3). Acknowledgments, access time,
and paus%:• in transmission are included in the total time. For example, a
typical position report as specified for use in the North Atlantic compulsory
loo reporting procedures would contain 75 to 80 words. This would
occupy 30 to 32 seconds. To account for pauses, acknowledgments, and
access procedures, 45 seconds was selected as an average message time.
(2)	 Information Bits — The information bit content of the message is defined
as the number of digital bits required to transmit the information in the
message, exclusive of redundancy and error correction bits. Seven bits per
alphanumeric character were used. Two categories of messages were assumed.
12
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The ATC messages (for example, the position report) are of a nature that
allows a standardized format to be adopted. This permitted considerable
reduction over a straight alphanumeric transmission. The other messages
were judged to be unpredictable in content and to require a straight char-
acter transmission. However in these ­,ses, a 50% to 60% reduction was
used based on eliminating some of the voice redundancy.
(3)	 Number of Messages — This value was determined from the peak-hour
instantaneous airplane count given in Sec. 2.3. The heavy traffic count was
used to derive the numbers in table 4 for two environments. The first is
the present-day environment where the requirement is to report a position
every 100 of longitude. In the traffic model used (table 2), there are 131
airplanes in the area of interest (longitude 10 0W to 500W) —68 subsonic
and 63 supersonic. The supersonic airplanes each generate three position
reports per hour; the subsonic, slightly more than one per hour. Therefore,
a total of 300 reports per hour was used. In addition, the requirement
exists to report when passing from the Gander control area (CTA) to the
Shanwick CTA; each supersonic airplane would do this once in the busy
hour. About one-third of the subsonic airplanes would pass from one con-
trol area to the other.
In the present environment, studies have shown that position-report messages
constitute 50% to 60% of the North Atlantic communications traffic.
To postulate the communications load in a future environment having more
reliable communications, a different approach is required. The position-
report messages were determined in the same manner as that for the present
messages except the rate was increased from every 100 to every 50 and then
to an automatic report every 3 minutes_ This was done to permit reduction
of separation standards as discussed in Sec. 4.
The other message quantities were determined using analyses performed of
typical U.S. message traffic. It was assumed that a future satellite system
will provide a similar capability and environment.
3.2 Communications Capacity Requirements
The next step followed in the analysis was to combine the requirements in table 4
with various operational concepts. This identifies the needed computer runs used to spec-
ify the communications system requirements. The indicated runs are shown in table 5.
The specified loads were run with various numbers of channels and for digital
transmission bit rates. The detailed results of each run can be found in app. C. A summary
of the results for the selected channel requirements is in table 6.
The number of channels was selected based on both the average delay per message
and the worst-case delay within each category of message.
An all-voice system (including voice position reports every 5 0) was investigated.
This concept using the same delay criteria required nine channels. A minimum capability
all-voice system required four channels.
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An approach having features of both the all-voice system and a surveillance system
was also analyzed. This consisted of automatic position reports on a digital channel with
the remaining messages voice transmitted. This approach required three voice and three
digital (100-bits per second) channels. The digital concepts were run for increased data
rates also. It is obvious that the amount of information transmission required could easily
be sent over one high-bit-rate channel (1000 to 1200 bits per second). The three-channel
requirement was selected, however, to supply redundancy to the system.
The preferred operational concept requires a surveillance-satellite system with a voice
communications capability. This concept requires five voice channels to give a weighted
average delay of 2.8 seconds for all messages. The maximum delay for a first-priority
message (including emergencies) was 9.6 seconds. The concept assumes that a priority
scheme can be implemented to permit access to the first open channel for an emergency
message. Without a priority scheme, an open channel would be added to the required five
for emergency use only. Channel utilization during the busy hour is 77.7`I-.
17
4.0 POSITION FIXING REQUIREMENTS
The objective of implementing an ATC satellite capability in the North Atlantic is
to permit an increasing flow of airplanes in this region to operate with safety equal to or
better than today's. The safety record currently being experienced in spite of unreliable
communications and relatively poor navigation accuracy (compared to domestic operations)
is kept within acceptable bounds by maintaining large, planned separations between air-
planes. With an increasing flow rate of aircraft, however, this separation causes increasing
economic penalties to airplanes that must deviate from an optimum track. Reduction of
these penalties by decreasing airplane separation is the incentive used to justify the cost of
improved ATC capability. The detailed evaluation of this cost-benefit tradeoff was not
within the scope of the analysis presented here. However, studies previously performed
and currently underway at Boeing indicate that the growing traffic in the North Atlantic
will in the 1975-1980 period justify the cost of both improved airborne navigation equip-
ment and ATC surveillance systems.
These studies have justified the inclusion of inertial navigation systems (INS) in both
airplane types (the U.S. SST and the Boeing 747) that Boeing customers will be o,)erating
during this time period. The use of an adequately monitored inertial system (assuming all
airplanes equipped) should permit a reduction in lateral separation from 120 to 60 nautical
miles (ref. 2). The addition of a surveillance capability overlaid on this track-keeping ability
will permit a further reduction in separation standards. This will also permit (to a yet to
be determined degree) the operation of less precisely navigated airplanes within the system
with similar separations.
The analysis presented here is aimed at specifying the performance requirements of
the ATC surveillance system based on safety and separation criteria. The mathematical
details of the models used in this analysis are contained in app. D.
The theoretical results given can be used as a basis for determining the requirements,
but the actual reduction of separation standards is usually accomplished through observa-
tion of the operational system long enough to validate the predicted operational charac-
teristics. The models then should be modified to account for these characteristics. Then,
the separation standards suited to the acceptable safety level can be implemented.
4.1 General Description
A collision risk model and an ATC surveillance model are used. Briefly, the pro-
cedure is as follows: (The mathematical derivations are included in app. D.)
The collision risk model (based on work done by the Royal Aircraft Establishment,
ref. 4) is used to determine an acceptable probability of overlap. Certain limitations are
recognized; for instance, the model does not include the ability of the pilot or a collision
avoidance system to reduce collision risk. However, the surveillance parameters are conser-
vative and are suita'le for developing terminal requirements. Probability of overlap is defined
as the probability that two aircraft (with planned separation in one dimension only) are
actually in conflict in that dimension. This is not the collision risk but is related to the
collision risk by the parameters of the model (traffic, airplane dimensions, probability of
conflict in the other dimensions, etc.). The "acceptable" collision risk is an input to the
model.
18
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The acceptable probability of overlap is an input to the ATC surveillance model
that brings in the airplane navigation and surveillance accuracies, the position reporting
rates, and the separation standards. These are the design parameters of most interest to
the study.
4.2 Analytic Description
This section outlines a qualitative description of the analyses leading to the models
used. It enables an evaluation to be made of the assumptions and approximations used in
Sec. 4.3, "Results."
4.11 Collision risk model.— In evaluating the effectiveness of a navigation system
in an enroute environment, such as the North Atlantic oceanic area, the breakdown of a
planned lateral (across-track) separation is the key factor. A collision can occur, however,
only when the two airplanes also coincide in altitude and along-track position. This coin-
cidence depends on the traffic situation (probability of another airplane being present),
airplane dimensions, and altitude and along-track distribution of airplanes at nominally
zero separation.
The lateral collision risk Cy is mathematically expressed as a function of the
following parameters:
(1)	 The total time during which the aircraft are laterally proximate. The time
is included for same-directior. traffic T ys and opposite-direction traffic
Tyo.
(2)	 The probability of vertical overlap of proximate aircraft Pzo and the
frequency with which vertical overlap occurs Nzo
(3)	 The along-track separation standard Sx.
(4)	 The aircraft parameters. The following terms are contained in the model:
(a) Average cruise speed V
(b) Mean cruise speed difference for same-direction proximate pairs
OV
(c) Aircraft dimensions Ax and Ay
(d) Relative across-track velocity {yi
(5)	 The probability of across-track overlap of laterally proximate aircraft P 
The collision risk (Cy = number of collisions) as a function of this probability
and using the preceding notation becomes
19
The detailed derivation of this equation is in app. D.
4.2.2 ATC surveillance model.— This model takes the overlap probability
(calculated based on an acceptable collision risk) and specifies the ATC capabilities
required to maintain this safety.
The model has been conservatively developed. This is desirable because of the
safety aspects in the analysis. The aim is to avoid collisions completely. Since this
requirement is not amenable to analysis, an "acceptable" safety level must be determined.
Use of a conservative approach in the model tends to bias the answers obtained toward
the zero-collision-risk goal.
An ATC surveillance system detects airplanes that represent a collision hazard and
then guides ^Aese airplanes toward a safe position. This view identifies two surveillance
parameters of special significance. alarm rate and the unfavorable alarm rate. Unfavorable
alarms guide an airplane into a more hazardous position. This situation is illustrated in
fig. 6. The airplane indicated is given an order to move to the right based on erroneous
information received from surveillance. This movement takes the airplane from an actual
location inside the nonalarm region to an actual position within the alarm region on the
right side. The curves shown are exaggerated for clarity.
The ratio, of unfavorable alarms to alarms is a key item to be specified. The value of
one unfavorable aiarm in a thousand used later in this volume ensures that unfavorable alarms
have a negligible effect on the safety criterion (acceptable overlap probability). The small
ratio, however, does force development of a more accurate surveillance system design than
would a less conservative model.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Probability of overlap.— The collision-risk model is used to determine an
acceptable overlap probability. Table 7 shows the values used in the model. Because the
proximity factors are the most critical to be estimated, their selection is discussed in detail
in the following paragraphs.
The total time spent in lateral proximity (defined as a condition in which two air-
planes.are nominally separated from each other only in the across-track direction) is a
function of the following:
(1) Transit time
(2) Total traffic
(3) Scheduling
(4) ATC procedures
(5) Number of flight levels
(6) Along-track separation
(7) Pilot preferences
20
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FIGURE 6.- "UNFAVORABLE-ALARMS
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The along-track separation standard Sx determines how many airplanes aie con-
sidered to be in proximity. Airplanes in tracks adjacent to each other and at the same
assigned altitude are proximate if they are also within two along -track separation standards
of each other. Therefore, the total proximity time for all airplanes is a direct function of
Sx.
The collision -risk equation as formulated requires the proximity times to be divided
by Sx. This has the effect of canceling the along-track separation standard from the
analysis. For this reason, a proximity factor (Tys/Sx and Tyo/Sx) in dimensions of hours
per nautical mile is estimated instead of the proximity time in hours.
The model requires an evaluation of both same-direction and opposite -direction
proximity. The same-direction value has a much greater effect on the final result than the
opposite-direction case (at least 80'7( of the total risk). This results from the longer time
spent in proximity by two aircraft flying in adjacent tracks in the same direction. For this
reason, emphasis was placed on determining the same-direction time more precisely.
The assumption is made that subsonic airplanes, the SST, and the Concorde will be
separated from each other in the enroute area by virtue of their differing flight level pre-
ferences (fig. 7). This permits each type of aircraft to be considered separately by model.
The total SST traffic for the 1975-1980 period is estimated at 380 000 flights.
Each SST is assumed to make 1.5 round-trip flights per day. The enroute SST transit
time for the North Atlantic is approximately 1 hour (from longitude l O oW to 50oW).
The effects of scheduling and ATC procedures on proximity time can be easily
seen by considering that the available SST's could readily be spaced throughout the day so
that no two aircraft could ever come close to each other. However, the peaking charac-
teristics of passenger demand preclude this being done.
Figure 8 shows a postulated distribution of flight times for ^ST's across the North
Atlantic. It was assumed further that the SST flights w^uld all occupy one flight level.
Using these two assumptions combined with the total traffic flow mentioned in Sec. 2.0,
an estimate of 5000 hours per nautical mile was made for the game-direction proximity time
as a function of the along-track separation standard Ty SISx. The value of the opposite-
direction proximity factor is estimated ai 40 hours per nautical mile.
In the subsonic case of approximately 780 000 flights and a 3-hour transit time,
the present-day peaking characteristics were assumed. This resulted in estimates of 40 000
and 320 hours per nautical mile. Since the collision risk is a direct function of these terms,
the subsonic case is more critical than the supersonic in this parameter. This is a result of
the fewer flights and the lower exposure time ( 1 hour versus 3 hours) for the supersonic case.
The other parameters required by the model are either fixed by the physical descrip-
tion of the airplane or have been determined by a less detailed analysis because of their
smaller effect on the final result.
The safety value selected is a fatal accident rate of 0.1 per 10 million flying hours.
This is based on the levels suggested by the North Atlantic Systems Planning group, which
is responsible for analyzing separation standards in the North Atlantic. This figure ensures
that North Atlantic collision accidents account for a negligible amount of the total
flying risk.
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The number of collisions Cy for the 1975-1980 period is determined as follows:
collisions = (fatal accident rate) x (total number of fights) x (flight time) x (collisions
per fatal accident). For the SST, Cyy = ( I / 10 8 ) (380 000)(1)(''/z) = 1.9 x 10-3. For
subsonic airplanes, Cy = (1/ 10 8 )(780000)(3)('h) = 1.17 x 10- 2 . These results assume
two fatal accidents per collision and 1-hour and 3-hour enroute flight times.
Finally, using these numbers in the model specifies an acceptable overlap proba-
bility of 6.8 x 10-9 for the SST and 1.75 x 10-8 for subsonic airplanes.
4.3.2 Surveillance system results.— This part of the analysis establishes the
position-fixing requirements. Surveillance accuracy and position fix rate are the most
critical values. The analysis has been performed for a typical supersonic-inertial
configuration and a subsonic configuration using present-day navigation techniques. These
choices should bracket the capabilities expected for the 1975-1980 period.
4.3.2.1 Supersonic-inertial results: The following values are assumed for the SST
with inertial navigation:
v
r = 5 n.mi. (overall accuracy/trip)
oT = 2 knots (drift rate—one sigma value)
Sr = 30 n.mi. (separation standard)
N	 = 150 aircraft
Navigation-system parameters yr and Qi are representative of an aircraft
equipped with inertial navigation equipment. The traffic figure is from Sec. 2.0 The
separation standard is chosen to reflect a requirement based on preliminary cost-benefit
considerations.
The ratio of unfavorable to favorable alarms is set at PA/PA = 10-3 . This value
ensures that unfavorable alarms have a negligible affect on the safety criterion.
The alarm rate selected is AI = 3 alarms per hour. This value is selected to pro-
duce a reasonable workload on the air traffic control facility and also fits in well with the
other parameters already selected, as an examination of fig. 9 will show.
Finally, the acceptable probability of overlap is selected as Pr = 6.8 x 10-9 from
Sec. 4.3.1.
Based on these values, a set of curves (derived from the curves in App. D) is
shown in fig. 9.
For an alarm rate of 3 alarms per hour, fig. 9(a) shows that the required alarm
threshold (ro) is approximately 10 n.mi. For convenience, assume
ro
 = 10 n.mi.
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For ro = 10, Sr = 30, Pr = 7 x 10- 9 , fig. 9(b) shows that the update interval
to is approximately 36 minutes.
Returning to fig. 9(a), with to = 36 minutes, the exact alarm rate is determined to be
Ai
 = 2.4 alarms/hr
which is acceptable.
'	 Entering fig. 9(c) with a  = 5, PA/PA = 10-3 , ro
 = 10, and to = 36
minutes.
ap = 0.9 n.mi.
Thus, the required accuracy and reporting rate are
Up = 0.9 n.mi.
to = 36 min
4.3.2.2 Subsonic preseni-day results: The following values are selected:
U  =	 12 n.mi.
yr =	 20 knots (lateral velocity error rate)
Sr =	 30 n.mi.
N =	 50 aircraft
Ai =	 3 alarms/hr
_	 as -,elected in the first case
PA/PA =	 10-3
Pr =	 1.75 x 10-8 (from Sec. 4.3.0
Figure 10 was constructed for these values.
In fig. 10(a) at Ai = 3, ro
 ^—,- 25 n.mi.
Figure 10(b) shows that a separation standard of 30 n.mi. is not feasible. Possible
alternatives are:
(1) Raise the separation standard
(2) Lower the alarm threshold (thus raising the alarm rate)
(3) Accept a lower level of safety Pr
Assume that the separation standard is allowed to be increased to 60 n.mi. then,
fig. 10(b) shows that to = 4.6 minutes at Pr = 1.8 x 10-8.
Returning to fig. 10(a), the alarm rate
Ar = 2.7 alarms/hr
is acceptable.
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that
	 Figure 10(c) shows, with U r = 12, PA /PA = 10-3 , ro = 25, and t o = 4.6,
O'µ = 2.4 n.mi.
Thus,
Qµ = 2.4 n.mi.
to _ 4.6 min
The two examples considered above are intended to be realistic estimatEs of what
might be expected in the 1980's. It is quite obvious that optimum utilization of the air-
space might require different separation standards and different surveillance requirements
for different type aircraft. If this happens, it might be possible to allow aircraft with less
stringent surveillance accuracy requirements to use simpler, less expensive airborne equip-
ment, whereas high-accuracy users would employ more sophisticated gear to obtain the
required accuracy. The basic surveillance system (independently of the airborne equipment)
must be able to meet the most stringent requirements placed on it by any user vehicle. If
the more stringent requirements on both accuracy and reporting rate are taken from each
of the two exercises considered above,
U = 1 n.mi.
to = 4 min
A surveillance system that meets these requirements will provide adequate ATC surveillance
service over the North Atlantic in the 1980's.
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5.0 IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES
The preceding sections have been confined to a discussion of the requirements
based on a limited extrapolation of the present operational environment over the North
Atlantic. The operational changes postulated are those that can be predicted to occur if
the proposed ATC satellite becomes operational. For example, the communications load
has been increased over that presently experienced by assuming that the increased avail-
ability of communications obtainable from a satellite system will lead to an environment
more like the present-day U.S. environment.
In this section, we will consider the possible effect of implementation of other
proposed systems. Those considered most likely in the 1970's are the Aircraft Integrated
Data System (AIDS), Automatic Flight Management (AFM), Collision Avoidance System
(CAS), and Pilot Warning Indicators (PWI). The implementation of any or all of these
systems is still not certain and depends on indeterminant factors. Also, the extent of
implementation is a key missing piece of information. Since no central authority exists to
enforce uniformity of operation in the North Atlantic, there is a low likelihood of any
estimates being correct. However, in spite of these limitations, enough is known about the
operation of these systems to enable an assessment of the impact of each on a satellite
ATC system. This is not the case for other possible systems. Therefore, only the identified
systems will be examined.
5.1 Aircraft Integrated Data System (AIDS)
An AIDS capability on an airplane would permit inflight fault detection and engine
and flight performance monitoring. The data collected would either be stored onboard
the airplane for later analysis or analyzed onboard and data-linked digitally to a ground
terminal. The possible data-link loading is of importance to a communications satellite
design.
To determine this loading, the following information must be available:
(1) Identification of parameters to be monitored
(2) Monitoring frequency
(3) Information content of parameters monitored
(4) Criteria for data-linking specified parameters
(5) Required availability of data (continuous or sampled)
This information is incomplete and not wholly available. Also, each user specifies
his own requirements. For example, some airlines would store all data onboard for later
analysis, whereas others would perform sufficient analysis onboard to data-link replacement
instructions to the Ground; some items of airplane operational information could be con-
tinuously transrnir;ed in real time. Obviously, the data-link loading would vary from zero
to a full-time dedicated channel for each airplane.
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However, considering the cost of a satellite digital data link, it is estimated that at
most only failure information requiring replacement would be data-linked in flight on a
North Atlantic crossing. Assuming about 100 items to be monitored with one failure
indication per flight and 25 12-bit words for identifying the failure, only 300 bits per
flight are required to be transmitted. If all 150 airplanes in flight would require a failure
indication during a peak hour, then 45 000 bits per hour might be required. One 1200-
bit-per-second channel would have approximately 100 times this capacity. Therefore, at
the most, it appears that two 1200-bit-per-second channels could handle any likely AIDS
requirement.
5.2 Automatic Flight Management (AFM)
The AFM system is a concept being developed at Boeing to improve safety and
economy in airline operations through: increased precision and reliability in control,
guidance, and navigation; improved data display and extensions to flight-deck automation
to reduce pilot workload; and automation of maintenance data collection and assess., tent
to reduce aircraft down-time. Use of an airborne digital computer is envisioned to optimally
filter sampled navigational data from several different sensors, compute position and guid-
ance errors relative to a stored flight plan, and automatically control the flightpath including
all-weather automatic landing and sequence and control electronic display instruments and
other automatic functions. This capability could have an influence on a future North
Atlantic ATC satellite system. Again, indeterminant factors will affect the extent of
this influence. The following factors are , post important:
(1) Number of AFM-equipped aircraft
(2) Compatibility of ground ATC environment with AFM
(3) Implementation of alternative approaches to ATC problems
The AFM airborne system design goals that may have a significant bearing on the
character and operation of overocean air traffic control in the future are as follows:
(1) ±300-foot horizontal position error enroute (U.S. domestic airspace)
(2) Prestorage of standard flightpaths (automatic path guidance)
(3) Reduced enroute separation
Quantitatively, AFM will provide continuous position (including altitude) measure-
ment to an accuracy of from 100 to 300 feet (2v) in U.S. domestic airspace, depending
upon (1) the navigation aids available and (2) control of the airplane to continuously
achieve a desired position as a function of time within an accuracy of 5 to 10 seconds
relative to the flight plan.
Normal flight will be based on the clearance stored in the AFM computer in terms
of the desired airplane position as a function of time. This would be compared to the
existing airplane position (and velocity) and error signals generateu for any required velo-
city or direction change. These error signals are displayed to the pilot; he may use them
either to fly the aircraft manually or to monitor system operation in the automatic mode.
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Thus, the aircraft will be maintained continuously oil
	 cleared flight plan or, if this
requires changes that exceed the airplane's performance, a changed flight plan that can be
quickly originated and approved.
Conceptually, tlus ca pability would permit the following operational ATC proce-
dures. The precise path to be followed enroute will be assigned by ATC in accordance
with a standard route procedure. (in some cases, a time schedule for key way-points is
chosen by the pilot).
The assignment will be entered in a ground computer system.
The AFM aircraft will be responsible for staying oil 	 assigned track. If it is
necessary to deviate from the assigned track, ATC will be alerted. Otherwise, the airplam
proceeds on its assigned track, occasionally checked by ATC radar. The radar data enters
the ATC computer, which checks the assigned track, and any discrepancy is flagged to
alert the controller.
Notice that:
(1)	 The aircraft position as computed onboard is not transmitted to the
ground. and
(^)	 No direct command information is normally sent from the ground to the
aircraft.
This eliminates the necessity for the high-volume data link, and yet all parties know
the aircraft status. When exceptions arise, the voice link is used.
Areas of no radar coverage, such as the North Atlantic, present no special problems.
The newer aircraft occupy higher altitude strata. AFM lateral precision path control using
LORAN-Inertial (automatically combined) would allow use of smaller horizontal separation
standards than those used by non-AFM-equipped aircraft.
It would seem that nothing would be gained by transmitting position data derived
onboard an AFM aircraft to the traffic control center. If the airborne equipment is work-
ing, the airplane will be exactly where it is supposed to be, which is known before takeoff
and is already in the ground computer. If its equipment is faulty, it could not transmit
useful data anyway. If any trouble is encountered in keeping on the assigned path and
schedule, the standard procedure might be to contact ATC for a new clearance and descend
to an altitude level at which traffic density is much less (non-AFM separation standards).
It should be remembered that the preceding is strictly conceptual at the present
time. No analysis of the concept for feasibility or cost benefit has been attempted. How-
ever, conclusions based on the above qualitative description would tend to minimize the
need for the satellite surveillance/navigation requirement for aircraft equipped with AFM.
The communications requirement in an AFM-ATC system would assume even greater
importance. The capacity requirement would probably be less due to elimination of some
portion of the voice load now assumed. However, a digital data link would be required.
This link would be similar to that required for an AIDS-type operation. In the preceding
section, we saw that two 1200-bit-per-second channels would probably be sufficient for
any conceivable situation.
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5.3 Collision Avoidance Systems (CAS) and Pilot Warning Indicators (PWI)
A collision avoidance system performs the following functions:
(1) Detect potentially dangerous intruders
(2) Evaluate the hazards presented by the detected aircraft
(3) Determine if a maneuver is required
(4) Indicate the evasive maneuver rc-quired to provide safe separation
The CAS is not intended to replace the ground-based air traffic control (ATC)
system nor should ATC rely on the CAS for providing safe separation for aircraft. The
role of the airborne CAS is to provide safe separation of aircraft independent of ATC when,
for any reason, the ATC system fails to fulfill its intended role.
For this reason, the effect on a satellite ATC system is expected to be minimal;
however, if all aircraft are equipped with CAS, it might be possible to reduce North
Atlantic separation standards. This follows from considering the collision-risk equation
discussed in Sec. 4.0. One of the assumptions in development of the model was that no
evasive action would be taken by colliding aircraft. A CAS would obviously change this
assumption. The model would have to be changed by some factor that would depend on
the operational and equipment characteristics of the implemented CAS.
Depending on the amount of possible separation reduction, the requirements placed
on the satellite position-fixing requirements would be lessened.
A quantitative analysis of this concept has not been attempted. Such a study
would involve detailed analyses of the several proposed CAS designs and modification of
the collision risk model based on these analyses.
A Pilot Warning Instrument (PWI) is a device that aids visual detection. Such
devices merely warn the pilot of the presence of other aircraft. Though they may provide
information on an intruder's location, they do not evaluate the nature of the situation nor
indicate appropriate maneuvers.
This can be analyzed in the same manner as the CAS. In this case, it is obvious
that a less effective system results because safe evasive maneuvering is not provided by the
system; further analysis is required to quantitatively determine the degree of benefit.
In either case, the lack of firm data about implementation plans and system
specifications precludes meaningful analysis at this time.
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6.0 RECOMMENDED SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
In the previous sections of this report, analyses were presented to show the effects
of the communications and navigation/surveillance system operational specifications on the
ATC operational environment. For example, the effects of the surveillance satellite
accuracy and position reporting rate on the separation standards and the collision risk were
analyzed in Sec. 4.0. Also, the effect of communications channel capacity on the message
transmission delays was analyzed in Sec. 3.0. In this section, these analyses are used in
specifying the requirements of a preferred system. The choi.e of a preferred system con-
figuration depends oil
	 this type of analysis and on other considerations. Cost-benefit
considerations play a significant role. Also operational constraints must be examined for
their effect on the selected system. Growth potential should also be factored into a selec-
tion. In this section, an attempt is made to incorporate all of these factors into a system
configuration that meets all requirements.
6.1 General Considerations
The purpose of providing a satellite capability for air traffic control is to allow
separation standards for reduced lateral and longitudinal spacings over the North Atlantic.
r'hese standards will decrease the frequency and magnitude of economic penalty asso-
ciat A with deviations from the optimum track that occur during peak traffic periods.
Tii: system concept and requirements must be chosen to provide the maximum
benefit-to-cost ratio, where the benefit is the reduction in airplane flight costs and cost is
the system investment and operational costs. Two mitigating factors in defining this
optimum operational concept are:
(1) Separation standards are chosen for some minimum acceptable collision
risk that, in turn, depends upon the frequency of occurrence of large
navigation err ors. Because these large errors are rare events, they are not
amenable to calculation; they are typically derived from operational
experience.
(2) Division of control responsibility due to ATC operational considerations
and the international political aspects of the control system may place:
constraints on the operationa! concept.
These factors are considered in developing the recommended system requirements.
6.2 Navigation/ Surveillance Requirements
These requirements are considered first because they significantly affect com-
munications requirements.
A surveillance capability provides airplane positional data to ATC using a separate
system from that for navigation. The advantage of surveillance is that errors in ATC and
airplane navigation positional data are not correlated. Thus, when a navigation error
occurs, the difference in airplane and ATC positional data provides evidence o ► the situa-
tion. This type of operation is epitomized by the U.S. domestic airspace syster.. in which
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the aircraft are navigated using the VOR/DME ground-based system wh,le ATC monitors
progress with primary and secondary radars.
The decision to use the ATC satellite capability for navigation or surveillance
depends fundamentally upon which approach will support the smaller separation standards.
Separation standards are chosen to provide an "acceptably" low probability of
collision. Since the probability of collision must be kept extremely small, North Atlantic
navigational errors greater than half the present separation standard are "rare events".
Navigational errors of this magnitude are generally referred to as "blunder errors". This
term is applied because large navigational errors are generally caused by equipment or
human failures rather than by equipment performance tolerances.
Present separation standards over the North Atlantic are 120 n.mi. laterally (across
track) and 15 minutes or more of flight time longitudinally (along track). During peak
traffic, the magnitude of these separations produces undesirably large deviations from the
most economical flightpath. Commercial aircraft operators would like to see the standards
provide for a reduction in separation of about an order of magnituL (e.g. 12 to 15 n.mi.
and 3 to 5 minutes).
A reduction in the lateral separation requires a significant improvement in track-
keeping accuracy. This can be accomplished either by improving the navigation accuracy,
by providing a surveillance capability, or by a combination of both. The system effective-
ness criterion is the probability of an unpredictable blunder error occurring. Because of
this unpredictability (especially before a system is used), the selection of a best approach
is a matter of controversy and is not easily analyzed.
Inertial navigation systems are expected to provide track-keeping accuracies through
the NAT Oceanic Control Area (OCA) of 8 to 12 n.mi. (2 v ). Without surveillance, this
capability is expected to support a 60-n.mi. lateral separation. Addition of a satellite sur-
veillance capability of 2 to 5 n.mi. (:s Q ) to this system could produce the desired 12- to
15-n.mi. separation. The use of inertial navigation systems (INS) will become prev-1ent in
the 1970-1980 period. The Boeing 747, American SST, and Concorde are planned with INS's,
whereas at least one air carrier (AAL) is seeking to retrofit its B707 aircraft. Most commer-
cial operations prefer a self-contained navigation system, because it allows worldwide opera-
tion and is indeperd: nt of failures in the external environment.
Thus, in summary, the best argument for surveillance is probably that because our
capability to predict blunder rate is very poor, we should devise separate standards to
achieve an order-of-magnitude reduction in spacings by splitting the risk between the air-
plane navigation system and an ATC satellite surveillance system.
Quantitatively, based on the analysis in sec. 4.0, the following requirements are
selected for the preferred surveillance system:
System accuracy ...... 	 1.0 n.mi. (la )
Reporting rate ........	 20 position reports/hour/airplane
Separation standard ....	 30 n.mi. (lower if operational experience permits)
Alarm rate ..........	 3/hr
Alarm threshold ....... 10 n.mi.
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The reporting rate specified above is 20 reports per hour per airph)ne or an up-
dating period of 3 minutes. The analysis in Sec. 4.0 indicated updating periods of 4.6
minutes for conventionally equipped subsonic airplanes and 36 minutes for inertially
equipped supersonic airplanes. The more stringent requirement specified above is chosen
to reflect a system designed to accommodate safely the lesser-equipped airplanes and also
to permit a possible reduction in longitudin•_i (along-track) separation requirements.
The present position reports of every 10 0 (about 45 minutes) support a longitu-
dinal separation of 15 minutes. This is sufficient separation to ensure a low probability of
a front-to-rear collision of two airplanes nominally separated in only the along-track dimen-
sion. Such a collision could occur because of inaccuracies in airplane velocity measurements.
'Tile lateral-collision risk evaluated in Sec. 4.0 involved errors in the across-track position
accuracy.
A detailed analysis of the along-track collision situation has not been performed in
this study. However, the update period of 3 minutes was selected based on similar
analyses performed by other groups (ref. 5).
0.3 Communications Requirements
The NAT OCA principal area is presently divided into four flight information
regions (FIR'S):
(1) Gander FIR controlled from Gander, Canada
(2) New York FIR- controlled from New York
(3) Sh- nwick F, R - controlled from Prestwick, Scotland
(4) Lisbon FIR -controlled from Lisbon, Portugal
With the introduction of supersonic aircraft, control is expected to be divided by
altitude with low-altitude sectors for flights below FL (flight level) ' 80, high-altitude
sectors between FL 180 and FL 420, and !iltra-high-altitude sectors above FL 420. Most
commerical traffic will use the two upper levels whereby subsonic jets are in the high
sectors and supersonic aircraft are in the ultrahigh sectors.
Real-time reliable communications and more frequent and accurate aircraft-p6 .Ition
data will allow ATC operation in which short-term clearances are feasible. 'This will con-
tribute to more economical and comfortable flight operations.
Reliable, minimum delay, ATC communications in this region will require that the
U.S. message load specified in table 4 be handled. Since a surveillance system is also speci-
fied, posit"ion reports can be eliminated. Five voice channels will be required to implement
this system. Ideally, all five channels should be time-shared among the four oceanic areas
handling traffic. The details of the ground terminals need further study to determine the
feasibility of this time sharing. A priority messar -handling technique is recommended. It'
this is not feasible, an emergency channel should be allocated.
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Quantitatively, the following requirements are specified:
Number of busy-hour messages ..................... 745
Required number of voice channels ...................	 5
Channel utilization ............................... less than 80%
Average delay (all messages)
	 ....................... less than 20 sec
Average delay (first-priority messages) ................ less than I sec
Worst-case delay (first-priority messages) ............... less than 10 sec
6.4 Recommended Operational Concept
The operational concept requirements are:
(1) Aircraft position, altitude, and identity should be automatically transmitted to
the appropriate control facility by a surveillance capability.
(2) The ATC satellite position deta should be used to provide ATC surveillance.
The choice of an active or passive system should be based on cost/benefit
considerations.
(3) Direct pilot-to-controller communications will be used. This is the functional
equivalent of a channel for use between each controller and those aircraft under
his jurisdiction. The mixture of voice and data link will depend upon ATC
development of facilities to use data-link messages.
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APPENDIX A
BACKGROUND ON NORTH ATLANTIC AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
A1.0 TRAFFIC CHARACTERISTICS
The North Atlantic ATC system has developed to accommodate the flow and flight
characteristics of international aviation.
A1.1 Routes
Approximately 50'/ of the Free World scheduled air carrier flights !re conducted
between North America and Europe over the North Atlantic (NAT). The cities that generate
the majoril, of this traffic are listed in table Al.
TABLE A 1. — PRINCIPAL NORTH ATLANTIC TRAFFIC-GENERATING CITIES
North America Europe
New York London
Montreal Paris
Toronto Frankfurt
Boston Rome
Chicago Amsterdam
Great-circle routes connecting these cities fall within a latitude band of about So
over the North Atlantic (fig. Al). The optimum track between any city pair is a minimum
time track (MTT) that considers the existing wind velocities. Since prevailing winds are
from west to east, eastbound MTT's tend to lie along the latitude of maximum w?rd veloc-
ity, whereas westbound MTT's skirt this latitude. Thus, at any one time, the MTT's
between various city pairs are usually more concentrated than the great-circle paths.
A1.2  Demand
The flights over the North Atlantic vary both with time of day and season. Most
eastbound passengers prefer to leave North America in the e^ ning and arrive in Europe the
next morning. Most westbound passengers prefer to leave EW; ;_ , z in the morning and arrive
in North America the same day. The resulting diurnal v :riation in flights is shown in fig. A2.
The seasonal variation is characterized by the summer peak, which is generally attributed to
tourists. Approximately 40 1% of the annual passenger traffic occurs during the busy months
of June, July, August, and September.
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A1.3 Aircraft
Most scheduled air carriers fly subsonic jet aircraft. The principal types are the
B-707, DC-8, and VC-10. These aircraft have similar speed and altitude capabilities. Thus,
the flight plans are usually similar with the desired altitude differing principally due to the
aircraft weight and pilot-company operating techniques. Figure A3 shows the actual alti-
tude usage for a 24-hour period and displays the congregation of aircraft in flights levels
310 to 370.
A2.0 PRESENT ENVIRONMENT
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) publishes a plan for the
provision of facilities and services for air navigation in the North Atlantic (ref. 6). These
facilities are provided by the contracting states. The principal facilities of interest are air
traffic services, communication, and navigation aids. This discussion is confined to those
facilities serving the principal North Atlantic area through which the majority of traffic
between north America and Europe normally moves.
A2.1 Air Traffic Services
The North Atlantic Region is subdivided i;.to control areas (CTA) as delineated in
fig. A4. The principal area consists of the New York, Lisbon, Gander, and Shanwick
Oceanic LTA's. The significant facilities are the area control centers (ACC) and the ocean
station vessels.
2.1.1 Air control centers (ACC).— Area control service is provided by an area con-
trol center for each control area. Control centers* for the principal area are located at:
(1) Ronkonkoma, New York (New York Oceanic CTA)
(2) Gander, Newfoundland (Gander Oa:anic CTA)
(3) Prestwick, Scotland (Shanwick Oceanic CTA)
(4) Santa Maria, Azores *
 (Lisbon Oceanic CTA)
Surveillance radar, VHF communications, and VOR navigation aids, which are
the basis for ATC over land, all have line-of-sight limited coverage. Generally these
facilities are located along the seacoast such that service for jet aircraft at cruise altitudes
is available out to about 200 n.mi. (fig. A5). It is partially because of this that oceanic
boundaries begin offshore approximately where the land-based ATC system becomes
ineffective.
Since radar surveillance is not available, oceanic controllers use flight progress strips,
flight plans, and position reports to plan initial clearances through the area and to moniter
flight progress. This "strategic" mode of control is employed wherein clearances are
granted for the entire flight through the CTA's.
* Lisbon ACC is planned.
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Pilots are required to make periodic position reports (normally when crossing the
loo meridians). If a flight fails to achieve its cleared flight plan such that it may come
within 1,-ss than the separation standard of another flight, clearances are revised to ensure
separation.
A2.1.2 Ocean station vessels ( USV). - Nine ships known as ocean station vessels
are positioned in the North Atlantic. These vessels are supplied by the NAT contracting
states. Their primary role is search and rescue while providing assistance to aircraft flying
past their position. Each ship has radar and both VHF and HF communications facilities.
Typically, they may provide position fixes to aircraft passing within line-of-sight and may
be involved in relaying messages be'.ween aircraft and the control centers.
A2.2 Air-Ground Communications
VHF is used for enroute commui ications when an airplane is within VHF coverage
of an aeronautical station. Generally this distance is within 200 n.mi. of land. Outside of
VHF coverage, HF radio telephony is employed. A network of HF stations is located around
the region and on ocean station vessels. The primary aeronautical stations are located at New
York, Gander, Prins Christian Sund, Reykjavik, Lisbon, and Shannon.
However, due to the vagaries of HF propagation, messages must often be relayed
through whatever station the aircraft can contact—sometimes via other aircraft.
In addition to air traffic service (ATS) communications facilities, Aeronautical
Radio, Incorporated (ARINC) has facilities for airline management communications with an
aircraft. These facilities are connected to the control centers via teletype and are often
used for air-to-ground ATC communications.
ARINC has HF sta +. ; ons and extended-range (propagation beyond line-of-sight by
tropospheric scatter) VHF stations. Figure A6 shows the ATS HF stations, ARINC extended-
range 30 000-foot coverage, and OSV VHF 30 000-foot coverage.
A2.3 Navigation
The basic long-distance radio navigation aids for the North Atlantic —gion are
LORAN and CONSOL supplemented by a number of nondirectional radio beacons (NDB).
In addition, Dectra is available. Most commerical aircraft are navigated using LORAN A
for position fixes, a gyro compass for directional guidance and either calculated wind
vectors or a doppler radar for velocity determination. CON!SOL and Dectra have limited
use, and LORAN C to date has not been employed.
Figure A7 shows LORAN A coverage for the NAT principal area. LORAN A
receivers allow the navigator to obtain readings from which he may calculate position.
The receivers must be manually operated and allow obtaining of only periodic position
data. (Continuous rill-time position is not available).
CONSOL stations are located in Europe and one in the United States (CONSOLAN).
They provide bearing to between 0.5 0 and 4.00 accuracy up to a range of approximately
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1000 nautical miles. Dectra I I provides a 5-n.mi. position-fixing accuracy (67`I: confidence
factor) over an elliptical region bounded by longitudes 5 0W and 55 0W and latitudes 451N
and 65oN.
Figure A8 shows the present LORAN C coverage in the NAT principal area. Although
LORAN C receivers that provide continuous position data are available, they have not been
emplo yed by commercial air carriers, which is probably due to the high cost of the equipment.
A3.0 SYSTEM OPERATION
The basic oceanic ATC system is a "free" system in which pilots file for their
desired track, speed, and altitude. ATC checks each flight plan against previous clearances
for conflicts. (Confict is where aircraft will come within less than the prescribed minimum
separation distance.) If no conflict is involved, the clearance is granted. Otherwise, the
clearance is revised to avoid conflicts.
A3.1 Separation Standards
The basic NAT separation standards (ref. 7) for subsonic jet aircraft are:
(1) Vertical--1000 feet below 30 000 feet altitude and 2000 feet above
30 000 feet altitude.
(2) Longitudinal-20 minutes of flying time except 15 minutes in the Gander
Oceanic, Reykjavik, Shanwick Oceanic, and Sondrestrom (south of 700N)
control areas, provided the aircraft have reported over the same entry point
into the oceanic controlled airspace and (a) follow the same track, or
(b) follow diverging tracks until another form of separation is established.
In practice, Gander ACC provides 15 : iinutes for aircraft on the same track,
provided they fly the same constant Mach number. if a faster aircraft is
following, they add 3 minutes for each Mach 0.01 difference.
(3) Lateral-120 nautical miles minimum
A3.2 Organized Tracks
Most flights through the NAT principal area fly essentially parallel tracks. To make
more efficient use of the available airspace during periods of peak traffic, ATC lays out a
series of parallel organized tracks and aircraft are clear ,;d only for flights along these tracks
(or outside of the area where the tracks are established). These tracks are organized and
operated as follows:
1(1) Gander ACC using expected eastbound traffic determines the hours in which
an organized system is needed. Based on the forecast meteorological condi-
tions, the minimum-time track (MTT) between New York and London is
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calculated. Tracks spaced 120 nautical miles laterally are defined cep.:^red
on the MTT (fig. A9). Typica:ly these tracks are between longitude 500W
and either longitude 8°W', 10°W. or 150W (depending upon latitude) in
segments crossing each 10 0 meridian at a whole or 11'_0 of latitude. Each
segment is a great-circle element.
(_)	 Gander personnel confer with Prestwick personnel to coordinate implemen-
tation of the organized system. Prestwick generally assigns two westbound
altitudes (FL 31 and Ft. 35) to Gander for eastbound use. Thus. Gander
has the four most desired flight levels (FL 31, 33, 35. and 37) available for
eastbound use. The system is flexible. and during extreme peaks up to six
tracks as shown may be defined. Altitude exchanges may be made for part of
or all of the tracks, and often westbound altitudes will not be released until the
eastbound peak has built up and the altitudes have been emptied of
westbound traffic.
(3) The organized tracks are made known to the airline planners for planning
purposes as soon as possible. The airlines provide Gander with the desired
flight plan (including track. altitude, and Mach number) prior to flight
departure. These flight plans are used by Gander for preliminary planning
on use of the _)rganized system.
(4) Flights approach the Gander center along the domestic airways. When
within VHF range of Gander, the Rights are assigned tracks, altitude, and
!Mach number. They then navigate to the track entry point at 500W.
(5) Westbound operations are handled in a similar fashion by Prestwick ACC.
Since today's westbound and eastbound diurnal traffic peaks are separated
by several hours, the two organized systems can normally be used without
significant convict.
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APPENDIX B
AIRPLANE TRAFFIC MODEL
61.0 INTRODUCTION
This appendix describes methods used to predict air traffic movements over the
North Atlantic during the 1975-1980 period. Section B2.0 discusses the forecasting models
that were used to predict annual passenger crossings. Section B3.0 describes a model that
predicts the distribution of flights in time based on estimated passenger crossings.
B2.0 FORECASTS OF ANNUAL PASSENGER CROSSINGS
For the past decade, air travel has grown faster than most other segments of the
Free World economy. This growth has been due to many factors: lower fares, greater
convenience, faster block time, etc.
The typical way of forecasting future passenger air travel is to assume that this
trend continues and to extrapolate the past growth into the future. The following num-
bers for the 1975-1980 period were derived in this way (extrapolated from FAA data,
refs. 1 and 8).
Year	 NAT annual passenger crossings
1975	 14 024 000
1976	 16 045 000
1977	 18 371 000
1978	 21 100 000
1979	 24 000 000
1980	 27 300 000
Although past extrapolations of this type have produced low estimates, continued
extrapolation eventually leads to airline revenues in excess of the Gross National Product
(GNP). For this reason, the passenger projection above has been used as an upper limit;
a more conservative approach is developed to determine a lower limit.
The approach adopted is to tie the growth of air traffic to historical trends in
population, GNP, and fares.
55
Traffic is defined as embarkations and debarkations of pa:;sengu-rs at U.S. and Canadian
poits of entry that originate or terminate in selected European countries. The countries
selected are:
Belgium
	 Netherlands
Denmark	 Norway
France
	 Sweden
Germany	 United Kingdom
Ireland
	 Portugal
Italy
Given constant yield, the rate of traffic growth is assumed to be a function of the present
level of traffic, the difference between the present leve! of traffic and the saturation level
y*, and the rate of growth of GNP per capita. Expressed mathematically,
	
8Y	 dxII	 2
- — (In y*
 — In y
	 y 
dt	 (BI)
	
ax I	 Tbl L	 d
where	 traffic	 GNP
y =	 x I =	 xj = yield (average fare)
population	 population
b 1 = constant of proportionality
Also, we assume that the elasticity of traffic with respect to fare is constant. That is, if fare
changes by 2%, then traffic will change by 2b2%. This assumption gives the differential
equation:
lay x2
r2a' y
b 2	 (B2)
Integrating equations B 1 and B2, we have
In y = In y *
 —	 b 	 + b 2 In x 2 	 (B3)x I
 — x0
where x0 is the standard of living (as given on p. 57)
Let	 b0 = In y*
Then
bl
Y = e b0 x I — 
x0 )(xob2)
	 (B4)
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We then have in the forecasting equation, eq. (134), traffic as a function of population,
GNP, and yield, with the constants bp, bl, b2, and xp to be determined. Equation
(114) can be linearized by the following transformations:
Y = inn y	 X1 = X 2 = In x 2 	 (B5)
x l
 — xp
Which gives
Y = by + b l X 1 + b2 X2
From historical data, we know xl, x2, and y. The problem is to estimate
bp, bl, b2, and x0 . Since the system is under-determined, we choose an initial xp
and estimate bp, bl, and b2 by a linear regression analysis. We calculate R, the
coefficient of correlation of historical traffic and predicted traffic for the same period.
An optimal search technique is then applied to choose x0 such that R is maximized.
The coefficients can be interpreted in the following way:
X0	 Standard of living below which one does not make transatlantic flights.
bo	 Parameter which specifies the saturation level of traffic, y* = eb.
b l	Parameter which measures the effect of the income variable. It is not
simply an elasticity, as can be seen from eq. (B 1).
b2	Elasticity of traffic with respect to yield.
Population and GNP are forecast for each country by linear regression of historical
data. A single yield series is developed for the average fare on transatlantic flights by
linear regression of historical fares.
The forecasting eq. (134) is plotted in fig. B 1.
Table BI contains the values of the coefficients in the forecasting equation and the
coefficient of correlation for each country. Table B2 gives observed and forecast GNP, table
B3 gives observed and forecast population, and tahte B4 gives the yield series.
Figure B2 shows the historical traffic data plotted on a logarithmic scale. The
forecast developed here is called the NATEM forecast to distinguish it from two forecasts
made by the FAA for the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). NATEM refers
to an economic mode' of North Atlantic ATC that is currently under development and
also requires a traffic input, Figure B3 plots the NATEM forecast and two forecasts
from ICAO. Table B5 tabulates observed and forecast traffic by country for the NATEM
forecast. The observed traffic for NATEM is taken from U.S. Immigration Service records
of passengers crossing the North Atlantic. The data consists of embarkations and debarka-
tions at Boston, New York, and Chicago.
A slight discrepancy will be noted between NATEM historical data and ICAO historical
data. The ICAO forecasts are based on passengers carried by International Air Transport
Association (IATA) airlines. Hence, the ICAO data base is slightly larger than the base
upon which the NATEM forecast is built. To compensate for this inadequacy, the NATEM
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FIGURE B1. - FORECASTING HYPOTHESIS WITH CONSTANT YIELD
TABLE 81. - FORECASTING EQUATION COEFFICIENTS
Country bo bi b2 x0 R
Belgium 5.30 -0.276 -1.318 0.679 0.962
Denmark 5.12 -0.322 -0.422 0.736 0.975
France 4.72 -0.807 -0191 0.210 0.988
Germany 4.69 -0.515 -0.747 0.081 0.982
Ire:and 5.74 -0.274 -0.446 0.361 0.975
Italy 4.53 -0.690 -0.152 0.084 0.984
Netherlands 5.11 -0.622 -0.434 0.192 0.968
Norway 4.44 -0.141 -0.933 0.426 0.836
Sweden 3.84 -0.338 -0.399 0.416 0.690
United Kingdom 5.51 -1.172 -0.191 0.495 0.994
Portugal 4.64 -0.281 -0.399 0.040 0.966
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TABLE 82 - OBSERVED AND FORECAST GNP(BILLIONS OF 1958 DOLLARS)
Year Belgium Denmark France Germany Iceland Itily
1950 8.96 4.18 31.90 28.80 1.58 18.49
1951 9.47 4.08 33.47 32.58 1.55 19.63
1952 9.70 4.20 35.81 36.34 1.62 19.87
1953 9.38 4.51 37.35 39 Q8 1.67 21.31
1954 9.66 4.66 39.54 4;e.y 1 1.69 22.22
1955 10.29 4.59 42.35 47.99 1.72 23.80
1956 10.62 4.62 45.93 52.32 1.66 24.85
1957 10.93 4.76 49.97 55.18 1.66 26.42
1958 10.90 4.98 49.94 57.88 1.65 27.44
1959 1110 5.42 51.49 62.11 1.15 29.31
1960 11.72 5.79 54.95 72.74 1.85 31.32
1961 12.26 6.18 57.24 77.67 1.93 33.93
1962 12.94 6.48 61.11 82.06 1.99 36.44
1963 13.65 6.49 64.66 84.86 2.08 37.O9
1964 14.58 7.13 68.85 90.75 2.25 40.01
1965 14.93 7.41 71.25 94.96 2.31 41.36
1966 15.59 7.62 74.70 97.42 2.33 43.58
1967 15.96 7.89 79.42 107.89 2.37 46.31
1968 16.38 8.18 84.11 118.69 2.42 49.04
1969 16.85 8.49 88.91 129.93 2.46 51.88
1970 17.35 8.83 93.88 141.72 2.52 54.85
1971 17.89 9.18 99.08 154.16 2.57 57.99
1972 18.47 9.56 104.54 167.37 2.63 61.30
1973 19.07 9.95 110.29 181.44 2.69 64.80
1974 19.70 10.36 116.35 196.49 2.75 68.51
1975 20.36 10.79 122.74 212.63 2.82 72.42
1976 21.05 11.24 129.48 229.95 2.88 76.55
1977 21.76 11.71 136.58 248.58 2.95 80.92
1978 22.50 12.20 144.08 268.64 3.03 85.54
1979 23.27 12.71 151.99 290.25 3.10 90.43
1980 24.07 13.24 160.33 313.55 3.18 95.59
1981 24.89 13.80 169.12 338.67 3.26 101.05
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TABLE 82 -Concluded
Year Netherlands Norway Sweden United Kingdom Portugal
1950 6.78 3.23 8.39 54.68 1.35
1951 7.11 3.50 8.79 54.92 1.47
1952 7.33 3.40 8.96 54.72 1.63
1953 7.81 3.45 9.06 56.87 1.58
1954 8.43 3.60 9.54 58.31' 1.76
1955 9.24 3.79 10.02 60.65 1.89
1956 9.85 4.09 10.38 62.20 2.04
1957 10.03 4.26 10.71 63.73 2.06
1958 9.99 4.03 10.62 64.48 2.06
1959 9.50 4.21 11.19 67.12 2.16
1960 11.52 4.47 11.69 70.44 2.31
1961 11.85 4.72 12.50 73.10 2.44
1962 12.48 4.80 12.95 73.15 2.54
1963 12.99 5.00 13.70 76.25 2.69
1964 14.66 5.28 14.71 81.23 2.93
1965 15.41 5.57 15.22 83.48 3.14
1966 16.24 5.82 15.64 84.70 3.28
1967 16.77 5.90 16.17 86.92 3.41
1968 17.57 6.06 16.76 89.35 3.58
1969 18.49 6.27 17.38 91.93 3.76
1970 19.48 6.49 18.04 94.62 3.96
1971 20.54 6.72 18.73 97.43 4.17
1972 21.66 6.96 19.47 100.33 4.39
1973 22.84 7.21 20.23 103.33 4.62
1974 24.09 7.47 21.03 106.42 4.87
1975 25.40 7.74 21.87 109.60 5.13
1976 26.79 8.02 22.74 112.89 5.40
1977 28.25 8.31 23.64 116.27 5.69
1978 29.79 8.60 24.59 119.75 5.99
1979 31.42 8.91 25.57 123.34 6.31
'1 980 33.13 9.24 26.59 127.04 6.64
1981 34.94 9.57 27.66 130.85 6.99
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TABLE e3. - OBSERVED AND FORECAST POPULATION(MILLIONS)
Year Belgium Denmark France Germany Iceland Italy
1950 8.93 4.27 41.70 50.00 2.96 46.70
1951 8.97 4.30 42.00 50.50 2.96 47.09
1952 9.02 4.33 42.30 50.80 2.95 47.35
1953 9.08 4.37 42.60 51.40 2.95 47.60
1954 9.12 4.41 43.00 51.90 2.94 47.91
1955 9.17 4.44 43.40 52.30 2.92 48.20
1956 9.23 4.47 43.80 53.00 2.90 48.47
1957 9.29 4.49 44.30 53.60 2.88 48.74
1958 9.36 4.51 44.80 54.20 2.85 49.04
1959 9.41 4.55 45.20 55.00 2.85 49.3E
1960 9.47 4.58 45.70 55.40 2.83 49.64
1961 9.50 4.61 46.20 56.20 2.82 49.90
1962 9.54 4.65 47.00 57.00 2.82 50.24
1963 9.61 4.68 47.80 57.60 2.84 50.64
1964 9.71 4.72 48.40 57.30 2.85 51.12
1965 9.79 4.76 49.00 58.10 2.87 51.57
1966 9.86 4.80 49.40 58.70 2.88 51.86
1967 9.91 4.83 49.91 59.46 2.86 52.16
1968 9.96 4.86 50.44 60.15 2.85 52.46
1969 10.01 4.89 50.97 60.81 2.83 52.78
1970 10.07 4.93 51.51 61.45 2.82 53.10
1971 10.13 4.96 52.0E 62.11 2.81 53.42
1972 10.19 5.00 52.61 62.76 2.80 53.75
1973 10.25 5.03 53.17 63.42 2.79 54.08
1974 10.31 5.07 53.75 64.09 2.78 54.42
1975 10.37 5.10 54.33 64.7E 2.77 54.76
1976 10.44 5.14 54.91 65.44 2.76 55.11
1977 10.50 5.18 55.51 66.12 2.75 55.45
1978 10.56 5.21 56.11 66.82 2.74 55.81
1979 10.63 5.25 56.72 57.52 2.73 56.16
1980 10.59 5.29 57.34 68.23 2.72 56.52
1981 10.76 5.32 57.97 68.95 2.71 56.87
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TABLE 83. - Concluded
Year Netherlands Norway Sweden United Kingdom Portugal
1950 10.11 3.26 7.00 50.60 8.40
1951 10.26 3.30 7.10 I	 50.60 8.50
1952 10.38 3.33 7.1 C 50.70 8.50
1953 10.50 3.36 7.20 50.90 8.50
1954 10.61 3.39 7.20 51.00 8.60
1955 10.75 3.43 7.30 51.20 8.60
1956 10.89 3.46 7.30 51.40 8.60
1957 11.02 3.49 7.40 51.60 8.60
1958 11.19 3.52 7.40 51.80 8.70
1959 11.35 3.55 7.40 52.10 8.80
1960 11.48 3.58 7.48 52.50 8.83
1961 11.64 3.61 7.52 53.00 8.89
1962 11.80 3.64 7.56 53.50 8.97
1963 11.97 3.67 7.60 53.80 9.04
1964 12.13 3.69 7.66 54.20 9.11
1965 12.29 3.72 7.73 54.40 9.20
1966 12.45 3.75 7.81 55.00 9.22
1967 12.61 3.78 7.82 55.24 9.26
;:'S8 i2 77 3.82 7.87 55.48 9.31
1969 12.54 3.86 7.92 55.74 9.36
1970 13.10 3.89 7.97 56.00 9.40
1971 13.27 3.92 8.01 56.27 9.46
1972 13.45 3.96 8.06 56.54 9.51
1973 13.62 4.00 8.12 56.82 9.56
1974 13.80 4.03 8.17 57.10 9.62
1975 13.98 4.07 8.22 57.39 9.67
1976 14.17 4.10 8.'7 57.68 9.73
1977 14.35 4.14 8.32 57.97 9.79
1978 14.54 4.18 8.37 58.27 9.84
1979 14.73 4.21 8.42 58.58 9.90
1980 14.92 4.25 8.48 58.88 9.96
1981 15.12 4.29 8.53 59.19 10.02
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TABLE B4. - OBSERVED AND FORECAST YIELD(1956 $IMILE)
Year Yield
1950 0.1788
1951 0.1292
1952 0.1227
1953 0.0840
1954 0.0839
1955 0.0840
1956 0.0861
1957 0.0797
1958 Q.C,-754
1959 0.0760
1960 0.0742
1961 0.0697
1962 0.0648
1963 0.O635
1964 0.0567
1965 0.0543
1966 0.0514
1967 0.0479
1968 0.0449
1969 0.0421
1970 0.0396
1971 0.0373
1972 0.0351
1973 0.0331
1974 0.0312
1975 0.6294
1976 0.0277
1977 0.0261
1978 0.0246
1979 0.0232
1980 0.0219
1981 0.0206
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ICAO HISTORICAL DATA	
OF
HISTORICAL DATA FOR NATEM FORECAST
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Year
FIGURE 82. -HISTORICAL NORTH ATLANTIC ANNUAL PASSENGER CROSSINGS
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TABLE 85. - NATEM OBSERVED AND FORECAST TRAFFIC(THOUSANDS OF ANNUAL PASSENGER CROSSINGS)
Year Belgium Denmark France Germany Ireland Italy
1950 7.3 6.9 44.9 31.2 14.9 19.2
1951 8.1 6.1 60.7 32.6 9.4 16.5
1952 12.2 10.6 88.2 63.2 16.5 24.3
1953 20.6 14.2 96.3 81.4 22.3 31.1
1954 15.9 15.0 100.0 106.3 24.8 38.4
1955 20.8 16.6 120.3 154.2 29.2 41.4
1956 22.7 20.4 144.2 157.2 35.4 51.2
1957 31.6 35.5 163.7 157.0 46.2 54.1
1958 57.1 50.2 189.0 194.5 56.3 70.8
1959 41.6 55.6 227.2 190.8 56.0 85.9
1960 62.2 82.9 283.2 213.6 66.7 116.7
1961 48.0 77.0 279.2 216.9 103.4 132.5
1962 62.8 79.3 324.5 250.3 101.9 174.6
1963 70.4 91.6 344.2 269.8 119.4 214.8
1964 86.9 11 '1.3 411.4 368.7 157.2 273.2
1965 97.8 123.2 440.8 412.5 186.0 291.6
1966 101.0 124.0 504.4 463.2 212.3 347.1
1967 126.1 145.0 506.8 455.3 205.7 310.9
1968 141.6 156.7 556.5 512.4 222.6 345.4
1969 158.5 168.9 606.6 570.8 240.7 380.3
1970 177.2 181.5 657.8 631.0 259.3 416.2
1971 197.7 194.6 710.5 693.8 279.0 452.9
1972 220.4 208.2 764.9 759.5 299.6 490.5
1973 245.3 222.1 821.1 828.4 320.7 528.7
1974 272.8 236.5 879.1 901.1 342.8 567.4
1975 302.8 251.3 938.9 977.5 365.5 606.6
1976 336.0 266.6 1000.6 1058.4 389.1 645.9
1977 372.4 282.3 1064.1 1143.9 413.4 685.4
1978 412.2 298.4 1129.4 1233.8 438.2 725.0
1979 456.0 315.0 1196.5 1329.1 464.0 764.3
1980 504.1 332.1 1265.5 1429.7 490.2 803.5
1981 556.6 349.6 1336.2 1535.9 517.2 842.3
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TABLE 85. -Concluded
Year Netherlands Norway Sweden United
Kingdom
Portugal
1950 20.2 4.5 7.2 91.4 9.0
1951 24.1 4.2 7.1 98.3 8.4
1952 30.5 4.3 6.6 127.8 10.2
1953 37.6 6.6 8.8 145.1 10.2
1954 41.1 6.9 9.8 160.2 15.6
1955 49.0 9.7 10.5 200.3 19.2
1956 56.8 8.5 12.2 225.8 24.0
1957 70.5 9.6 12.3 272.4 29.7
1958 78.9 13.6 11.5 306.3 35.6
1959 100.2 13.5 8.8 404.1 32.5
1960 130.5 5.8 6.0 516.3 46.6
1961 131.9 11.6 6.6 520.8 49.2
1962 144.0 13.6 11.5 578.4 55.0
1963 137.5 11.2 16.7 653.5 64.7
1964 170.7 12.0 21.7 847.4 86.9
1965 193.7 13.9 21.5 963.1 115.6
1966 212.2 24.7 23.5 1058.4 148.0
1967 234.2 18.3 18.2 1087.2 105.5
1968 256.2 19.8 19.1 1201.0 113.2
1969 281.1 21.4 20.1 1324.8 121.6
1970 307.9 23.0 21.1 1457.8 130.3
1971 336.4 24.8 22.1 1599.3 139.1
1972 366.7 26.7 23.1 1749.3 147.9
1973 398.6 28.7 24.1 1907.3 156.7
1974 432.4 30.9 25.2 2073.5 165.3
1975 468.0 33.1 26.4 2247.5 173.8
1976 505.6 35.6 27.5 2430.0 182.0
1977 545.2 38.2 28.7 2620.6 190.0
1978 586.8 41.0 29.9 2819.3 197.7
1979 630.5 44.0 31.2 3026.3 205.1
1980 676.5 47.2 32.5 3241.7 212.2
1981 724.7 50.5 33.8 3465.2 219.0
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forecast was revised upward by a standard linear regression formula to reflect the ICAO
historical data. The revised NATEM forecast was used in this study and is plotted in fig. B3
and tabulated as follows:
Year	 NAT annual passenger crossings
1975 8 454 000
1976 8 978 000
1977 9 515 000
1978 10 061 OOJ
1979 10 621 000
1980 11 243 000
B3.0 FORECAST OF DAILY FLIGHT DISTRIBUTIONS
The forecast annual passenger crossings are input to a computer program called the
Demand Model. The Demand Model uses the passenger forecast and assumptions about
passenger preference for supersonic versus subsonic flight, preference for flights at certain
times of the day, load factor, and the percentage of military and cargo flights to calculate
the hour-by-hour number of flights entering the oceanic area on a busy summer day.
Figure B4 illustrates the procedure used by the Demand Model. Table B6 gives the input
quantities that were used in developing the two forecasts used in this study.
Two forecasts of hourly entries into the oceanic system have been developed. The
input parameters are selected in forecast A to maximize the number of flights. In forecast
B, a lower limit of North Atlantic flights has been determined. These two forecasts
should bracket the actual situation and were used to determine a minimum and preferred
capability for the ATC satellite system.
Forecast A uses the upper-limit passenger forecast described previously and an
assumption of 75% preference for supersonic flight. Forecast B uses the revised NATEM
forecast, a 50% preference for supersonic flights, and a higher proportion of 747's than
forecast A.
The seasonal variation adjusts the average daily flight to compensate for seasonal
peaking. The assumption is the same as in Dunmire (ref. 9); that is, 40% of the annual
traffic is evenly distributed in the months of June, July, August, and September.
The parameter K, the ratio of U.S. SST flights to Concorde flights, was taken from
a variety of sources. For forecast A, K was computed for 1980 from Dunmire (ref. 9).
The basic assumption used by Dunmire was that the U.S. SST would have 70% of the
2800- to 4000-n.mi. market and the Concorde would have 10 17o. The values for 1975 through
1979 are interpolated at constant growth rate. The values of K for forecast B are taken
from the ICAO 1967 forecast for 1975 and 1976. The values used for 1977 through 1980
are estimates made from published delivery schedules.
The ratio of 747 flights to other subsonic flights M was also taken from a variety
of sources. The values for 1975 and 1976 for forecast B were approximated from the
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DAILY SUPERSONIC PASSENGERS = (ANNUAL PASSENGERS' x SEASONAL VARIATION') 1% SUPERSONIC')
365
DAILY SUBSONIC PASSENGERS = (ANNUAL PASSENGERS') (SEASONAL VARIATION') 1100% - % SUPERSONIC')
365
SOLVE FOR U.S. SST FLIGHTS AND
CONCORDE FLIGHTS
U.S. SST FLIGHTS
	
= K'
CONCORDE FLIGHTS
(IU.S. - SST FLIGHTS) (U.S. - SST CAPACITY') + (CONCORDE FLIGHTS) (CONCORDE CAPACITY'))
(SUPERSONIC LOAD FACTOR - ) = DAILY SUPERSONIC PASSENGERS
SOLVE FOR 747 FLIGHTS,
707 FLIGHTS, AND DC8-63 FLIGHTS
747 FLIGHTS
707 FLIGHTS + DC8 63 FLIGHTS = M'
707 FLIGHTS - DC8 FLIGHTS
	 = 0
11747 FLIGHTS) (747 CAPACITY') + (707 FLIGHTS) (707 CAPACITY')
+ (DCB FLIGHTS) (DC8 CAPACITY')) (SUBSONIC LOAD FACTOR) = DAILY SUBSONIC PASSENGERS
NONSCHEDULED AND MILITARY FLIGHTS = N' (TOTAL SCHEDULED SUBSONIC AND SUPERSONIC FLIGHTS)
IF
DISTRIBUTE SUBSONIC, SUPERSONIC, AND CARGO FLIGHTS'
THROUGHOUT DAY BY % ' IN EACH HOUR
DENOTES INPUT QUANTITY
FIGURE B4. - DEMAND MODEL LOGIC
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TABLE B6. - DEMAND MODEL INPUT PARAMETERS
Parameter Forecast A1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
1.	 DRS 75 I	 75 75 75 75 75
(% supersonic)
2.	 SV 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
(seasonal variation)
3.	 K 0 0.8 1.6 2.4 3.2 4.05
(ratio of U.S.-SST
flights to Concorde
flights)
4.	 PLF 75% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60%
(supersonic passenger
load factor)
5.	 CC 134 134 134 134 134 134
(Concorde passenger
capacity)
6.	 ASC 280 280 280 280 280 280
(U.S.-SST passenger
capacity)
7.	 M 1.25 2.22 2.22 2.22 2.22 2.22
(ratio of 747 flights to
other subsonic flights)
8.	 PLF 2 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56
(subsonic passenger
load factor)
9.	 JC 363 363 363 363 363 363(747 passenger
capacity)
10.	 BC 141 141 141 141 141 141
(707 passenger
capacity)
11.	 N 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
(ratio of nonscheduled
and military flights to
scheduled flights)
12.	 DC 250 250 250 250 250 250
(DC8-63 passenger
capacity)
13.	 FCF 70 79 90 104 118 134
(daily number of all-
cargo crossings)
14.	 A 14.0x 16.0x 18.4x 21.0x 24.0x 27.3x(annual passenger 106 106 106 106 106 106
crossings)
70
TABLE B6. -Concluded
Parameter
Forecast B
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
1.	 DRS 50 50 50 50 50 50
(% supersonic)
2.	 SV 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
(seasonal variation)
3.	 K 0.16 0.26 0.295 1	 1.0 2.0 2.0
(ratio of U.S. - SST
flights to Concorde
flights)
4.	 PLF 75% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60%
(supersonic passenger
load factor)
5.	 CC 134 134 134 134 134 134
(Concorde passenger
capacity)
6.	 ASC (U.S.-SST 280 280 280 280 280 280
passenger capacity)
7.	 M 0.85 1.52 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
(ratio of 747 flights
to other subsonic
flights)
8.	 PLF2 56% 56% 56% 56% 56% 56%
(subsonic	 passenger
load factor)
9.	 JC 363 363 363 363 363 363
(747 passenger
capacity)
10.	 BC 141 141 141 141 141 141
(707 passenger
capacity)
11.	 N 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
(ratio of
nonscheduled and
military flights to
scheduled flights)
12.	 DC 250 250 250 250 250 250
(DC8-63 passenger
capacity)
13.	 FCF 70 79 90 104 118 134
(daily number of all-
cargo crossings)
14.	 A 8.454 8.978 9.515 10.061 10.621 11.243
(annual passenger x 106 x 106 x 106 x 106 x 106 x 106
crossings)
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1968 ICAO forecast. The ratio is assumed to level off and remain constant at 2.5 for
1977 through 1980. The values of M for forecast A were approximated from delivery
schedules.
Flights other than scheduled passenger flights or cargo flights are assumed to com-
prise 15% of all flights exclusive of cargo.
The number of cargo flights is estimated by the Boeing Market Research Organiza-
tion. The forecast assumes a growth factor of 9.2 from 1965 to 1980. Forecasts A and
B use the same projection of cargo flights. A constant growth rate of 12.9% is assumed
for 1975 through 1980.
Passenger load factors for supersonic flights are assumed to be 75% during the
early years of SST operations, declining to 60%. Subsonic passenger load factors were
assumed to remain at the current level of 56%.
The final step in the Demand Model is to distribute the daily flights into an hour-
by-hour schedule. Three categories of flight distributions are input to the model: (1)
supersonic passenger flights, (2) all-cargo flights, and (3) all other subsonic flights. The
supersonic flight distributions were taken from Dunmire (ref. 9). Mr. Dunmire considers
supersonic scheduling at great length in his report. The distribution used here was deter-
mined to be the best of several alternative schedules in terms of daily utilization and the
necessity to remain overnight on the opposite side of the Atlantic from the point of
origination. Figures B5 and B6 illustrate the flight scheduling.
The schedules developed for use with the Demand Model give the time of entry
into the oceanic control area (OCA). For the purposes of the model and of this study,
the OCA is considered to be the area between IO oW and 500W.
The all-cargo flight distribution was derived from all-cargo flights listed in the
Official Airline Guide (Worldwide Timetable Edition) for December 1967. The frequency
of flights during each hour of each day of the week was tabulated. The average percentage
of departures for each hour was computed and projected to the time that the flights would
cross 100W
 for westbound flights and 50OW for eastbound flights.
The other subsonic flight distributions were taken from data collected by the
Gander Air Traffic Control Center from August 4 to 10; 1967. The number of flights for
each hour of each day was tabulated and each hour was averaged over the week. Figures
B7 and B8 plot the hourly flight distributions. Tables B7 and B8 also list the hourly
distribution.
Busy-day flights, peak hourly flow, peak instantaneous count, and the spatial
distributions of the peak instantaneous counts are tabulated in tables B9 through B15.
Peak instantaneous count is calculated for all flights crossing the North Atlantic in the .
area from OoW to 700W.
 This larger area was necessary to encompass subsonic tracks that
fall in the New York Oceanic Control Area. To calculate the peak instantaneous count, it
was assumed that subsonic aircraft spend 5-1/2 hours and supersonic aircraft spend 2-1/2
hours in the area from OoW to 700W.
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TABLE B7. — HYPOTHETICAL SUPERSONIC TRAFFIC DISTRIBUTION(PERCENT OF DAILY TRAFF!C IN EACH HOUR)
Time,
GMT
Eastbound at
50OW
Westbound at
10oW
0 to	 1 - -
1 to	 2 ---- ----
2 to 3 ---- ----
3 to 4 ---- ----
4 to	 5 ---- ----
5 to	 6 ---- ----
6 to	 7 ---- ----
7 to	 8 ---- ----
8 to 9 ---- ----
9 to 10 ---- 2.0
10 to 11 ---- 6.0
11 to 12 ---- 8.0
12 to 13 ---- 8.0
13 to 14 5.0 6.0
14 to 15 15.0 2.0
15 to 16 20.0 2.0
16 to 17 20.0 8.0
17 to 18 15.0 12.0
18 to 19 5.0 8.0
19 to 20 ---- 4.0
20 to 21 5.0 4.0
21 to 22 10.0 6.0
22 to 23 5.0 14.0
23 to 24 10.0
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TABLE B8. - SUBSONIC TRAFFIC DISTRIBUTION(PERCENT OF DAILY TRAFFIC IN EACH HOUR)
Time,
GMT
Eastbound
passenger at
50OW
Westbound
passenger at
10oW
Eastbound
cargo at
50OW
Westbound
cargo at
10 W
0 to	 1 3.5 0.5 1.2 6.7
1 to	 2 8.4 0.8 0.0 5.6
2 to	 3 11.8 0.6 1.2 3.8
3 to	 4 16.9 0.4 1.2 5.0
4 to	 5 13.6 1.0 2.3 10.5
5 to	 6 12.7 1.4 8.0 13.7
6 to	 7 9.0 1.0 3.4 7.2
7 to	 8 4.6 0.8 8.0 6.1
8 tc	 9 3.3 0.4 0.0 6.1
9 to 10 2.0 0.8 1.2 1.1
10 to 11 1.8 4.0 8.0 1.1
11 to 12 0.7 8.3 4.6 6.1
12 to 13 0.7 11.2 2.3 5.6
13 to 14 0.7 12.7 10.3 0.6
14 to 15 0.6 14.0 11.4 0.6
15 to 16 0.5 12.6 6.9 1.7
16 to 17 2.4 9.9 9.2 2.8
17 to 18 3.4 7.6 1.2 1.7
18 to 19 0.9 5.4 1.2 1.1
19 to 20 0.3 3.2 2.3 1.1
20 to 21 0.6 1.0 3.4 0.6
21 to 22 0.6 0.7 0.0 1.7
22 to 23 0.3 0.9 1.2 3.9
23 to 24 0.7 0.8 11.5 5.6
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TABLE B9. — BUSY-DAY FLIGHTS BY AIRCRAFT TYPE
Year
Type 1975 1976 1977 1	 1978 1	 1979 1	 1980
Forecastof
flight A B A B A B 1	 A B A B A I	 B
U.S.—SST 0 18 147 34 193 40 257 78 306 100 358 106
Concorde 344 112 184 130 120 132 107 78 96 50 89 53
747 40 37 52 48 60 58 68 61 78 65 89 68
DC8-63 16 22 12 16 13 12 15 12 18 13 20 14
707 16 22 12 16 13 12 15 12 18 13 20 14
All cargo 70 70 79 79 88 90 104 104 118 118 134 134
General aviation
and military 58 29 60 30 651 361 761 281 771 351 921 34
TOTAL 544 310 546 353 552 380 642 373 711 394 802 423
TABLE B10. - AIRPLANE TRAFFIC PARAMETERS(FORECAST A): PEAK BUSY-HOUR FLOW
Year
Subsonic Su ersonic
Eastbound Westbound Eastbound Westbound
1975 11 10 34 21
1976 12 11 33 20
1977 14 12 34 20
1978 15 13 36 22
1979 17 15 40 24
1980 19 17 45 27
Note: Noncoincident peaks
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TABLE 811. — AIRPLANE TRAFFIC PARAMETERS(FORECAST A): PEAK INSTANTANEOUS COUNT
Year Subsonic Supersonic Total
1975 56 108 164
1976 64 113 177
1977 68 106 174
1978 80 125 205
1979 89 137 226
1980 104 154 258
Assumptions:
1. North Atlantic principal area: 40O N to 60ON
2. High-assumption passenger forecast
3. 75% supersonic preference
TABLE B12. — AIRPLANE TRAFFIC PARAMETERS(FORECAST B): PEAK BUSY-HOUR FLOW
Year
Subsonic supersonic
Eastbound Westbound Eastbound Westbound
1975 10 9 13 8
1976 10 9 16 10
1977 10 9 17 10
1978 11 10 16 9
1979 12 11 15 9
1980 12 11 16 9
Note: Noncoincident peaks
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TABLE 813. — AIRPLANE TRAFFIC PARAMETERS(FORECAST B): PEAK INSTANTANEOUS COUNT
Year Subsonic Supersonic Total
1975 53 44 97
1976 57 56 113
1977 58 59 117
1978 65 54 119
1979 70 52 122
1980 73 55 128
Assumptions:
1. Optimistic 747 forecast
2. 50% supersonic preference
3. Low-assumption passenger forecast
4. North Atlantic principal area: 40 ON to 60ON
TABLE B14. — NORTH ATLANTIC TRAFFIC SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION(FORECAST A)
Number of a irplanes
Subsonic SupersonicRegion Longitude
Polar
(60oN to 900 N) -- 10 4
0oW to 10oW 12 19
10OW to 20OW 20 16
Principal 20OW to 30OW 16 15
area 300W to 40OW 16 16
(40oN to 600 N) 40OW to 50OW 16 16
50OW to 60OW 14 37
60OW to 70OW 10 35
Other
(00 to 400N) ---- 26 9
TOTA L 140 167
Assumptions:
1. For 1980; transoceanic traffic; peak busy summer day; instantaneous count; 75%
supersonic preference.
2. High-assumption passenger forecast
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TABLE 815. — NORTH ATLANTIC TRAFFIC SPAT/AL DISTRIBUTION(FORECAST BI
Number of airplanes
Subsonic SupersonicRegion Longitude
Polar
WO N to 900N) ---- 10 4
0oW to 10oW 17 13
10OW to 20O W 12 6
Principal 20OW to 30OW 14 5
area 30OW to 40OW 13 5
(40oN to 600N) 40OW to 50OW 10 6
50OW to 60OW 13 7
60OW to 70OW 9 7
Other
(00 to 400N) ---- 26 9
TOTAL 124 62
Assumptions:
For 1980; transoceanic traffic; peak busy summer day; instantaneous count; 50%
supersonic preference
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APPENDIX C
COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC MODEL
C1.0 INTRODUCTION
The communications capacity requirements were determined in three steps:
(1)	 Message identification
(l)	 Message analysis
(3)	 Delay analysis
Message identification was accomplished using studies 'refs. 3 and 10) of both the
typical U.S. communications environment and the North Atlantic message traffic in
today's ATC system. The U.S. traffic was used to postulate the future North Atlantic
environment with the improvements in capability that a communications satellite
would bring.
The message analysis was performed using the referenced studies and some simple
mathematical operations on the typical content of the identified messages.
Finally, a delay analysis was performed using a computer simulation of the message
queueing situation.
The message delay statistics were used as the criterion for selecting the required
channel capacity. The results are summarized in table 6 of the text. A detailed descrip-
tion of the process is given in the following paragraphs.
C2.0 MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION
Reference 3 contains the details of an exhaustive survey of the U.S. air traffic
control communications environment. The messages identified in table Cl were extracted
from this report. These messages represent the major bulk of the ATC communications
load presently being experienced in the U.S. domestic airspace.
To project these typical ATC messages into a North Atlantic environment, a modi-
fication based on the North Atlantic operational procedures is required. Reference 10 was
used as the basic source of data for this task. A summary of the North Atlantic back-
ground material is given in app. A.
The result of this procedure is to eliminate the comma: iications incident messages
as a major category and to modify the grouping of the otre, messages slightly. Also, a
first-priority group of messages was added to the categories. This group contains messages
that should be transmitted with minimum delay.
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TABLE C1. — U.S DOMESTIC ATC COMMUNICATIONS
Probability
of Duration, Distribution
Message occurrence seconds percentage
Air traffic control instructions
Aircraft vectoring message 0.035 6.6 5.5
Altitude control 0.094 7.4 10.6
Clearance control 0.076 13.52 10.4
Communication support messages
Report in message 0.127 3.07 7.6
Beacon control 0.045 5.87 7.9
Vector and speed reports 0.046 7.59 8.0
Air traffic control support
Position report 0.125 6.9 5.0
Altitude report 0.255 4.19 26.5
Vector and speed reports 0.012 6.78 1.4
Advisory messages
Aircraft traffic advisory 0.026 8.81 1.7
Weather 0.081 9.44 3.4
Airport status 0.004 4.87 ....
Communication incidents 0.074 8.0 10.1
Miscellaneous messages Negligible •••. 1.9
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Using this procedure, the following list of message types was used as a base:
First-Priority
Messages ...... Emergency
Conflict resolution
Other
Air Traffic Control
Messages ...... Position reports
Clearance control
Vectoring messages
Advisory
Messages ...... Aircraft traffic advisories
Airport status
Weather
Unclassified
Messages ...... Miscellaneous
Non-ATC Messages
This list is ordered by importance to the ATC system. The messages fall naturally
into four priority groups as indicated.
In this listing, no attempt has been made to produce a narrowly defined message
structure. For example, an emergency message in this list might involve anything from a
faulty engine or meter reading to an ill passenger, solar flare warnings, or even an inflight
coilision causing an airplane crash. The conflict resolution message is meant to include all
those messages that ATC handles that change the airplane tlightpath to avoid a possible
collision risk.
The ATC messages are less critical. They are messages upon which ATC operates
to determine possible conflicts. The position report is the most important of these. This
includes both the required complete position report and the shorter altitude, speed, or
vector reports.
The clearance control message is required for aircraft passing from one control area
to another. Vectoring messages are included to handle a situation in which an aircraft
requests a deviation from a planned flightpath that requires precise control of aircraft
position.
The advisory-type messages are less critical again to the ATC. They are messages
that do not require quick response. Information about nearby (nonconflicting) airplanes,
airport delays, and weather are included.
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Finally, a category is included for miscellaneous ATC messages not categorized
above and non-ATC messages that might be considered for transmission, such as airline
management data.
C3.0 MESSAGE ANALYSIS
The next step was to choose the lengths and frequency of transmission of the
identified messages. Briefly, the lengths were chosen by examining typical content of
the messages and determining the time required for the controller/pilot to speak this
content. Additional time was added to account for voice access to the communications
link and for pauses and acknowledgments.
C3.1 Talking Rate
The talking rate is defined as the speech rate in words per second. Table C2 was
extracted from ref. 3. Table C3 indicates that controllers speak at a 5% greater word rate
than pilots. This may be because controllers become more expert at subject matter. A
speech rate of 2.5 words per second was selected.
C3.2 Message Length
The longest and most frequent message transmitted over the North Atlantic is the
required position report (every 101 of longitude). A typical message (from the International
Civil Aviation Organization specifications) might read as follows.
Pilot:	 PAN AMERICAN BOEING SEVEN ZERO SEVEN PAPA ALFA
WUN ZERO SIX OVER.
Controller: CLIPPER ROGER PAPA ALFA WUN ZERO SIX THIS IS GANDER
CENTER OVER.
Pilot:	 GANDER CENTER ROGER CLIPPER PAPA ALFA ONE ZERO SIX
HEADING TWO AIT ZERO POSITION FOWer NINer FOWer FIFE
NORTH FIFE ZERO WEST AT WUN TREE WUN SEVEN FLIGHT
LEVEL WUN NINer ZERO NEXT POSITION FIFE ZERO ZERO
ZERO NORTH FOWer ZERO WEST AT TREE FIFE ESTIMATED
TIME OF ARRIVAL ONE FOWer ZERO ZERO GREENWICH
ENDURANCE NINer HOURS TREE ZERO MINUS ONE AIT TOO FIL-'r
FIFE TREE FIFE SPOT TURBULENCE MODERATE BROKEN
CUMULONIMBUS TOP FLIGHT LEVEL TREE ZERO OVER.
Controller: CLIPPER ONE ZERO SIX CONTINUE ON PRESENT COURSE
OVER.
This message has 113 words. Assuming an average speech rate for controllers and
pilot as 2.5 words per second, the message duration is then 45 seconds. Similar procedures
were used to specify lengths of the other messages. The following values were used:
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TABLE C2. — TALKING RATE FOR PILOTS AND CONTROLLERS
Low or transitional
altitudes High altitudes
Controller	 Pilot Controller	 ;	 Pilot
words/second words/second
2.45
	 2.36 2.70	 2.73
(1.18)
	 0.04)
i
(0.57)	 i	 (0.59)
( 1 Indicates pauses per 100 wurds; strong negative correlation between talking rate and
pausing rate.
TABLE C3. — TALKING AND PAUSING RATES FOR A/G/A COMMUNICATIONS
Range of Average
Type talkers talking rates, talking rate, Average pauses
wps wps per 100 words
Fast-talking communicators 2.81 to 3.15 2.97 0.30
Average communicators 2.32 to 2.76 2.51 0.88
Slow communicators 1.92 to 2.33 2.21 1.72
All communicators 1.92 to 3.16 2.54 0.92
NOTE: The average A/G/A communicator talks at the rate of about 2.5 words per second,
and the overall range extends from about 1.9 to 3.2 words per second.
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Time (sec)
Emergency	 ....................... 30
Conflict resolution	 .................. 30
Other first priority
	 .................. 30
Position report ..........	 ........... 45
Clearance control
	 .................. 15
Vectoring messages	 ...... ............... 10
Aircraft traffic .......................... 10
Airport status	 ......................... 5
Weather advisory	 ....................... 10
Non-ATC
	
............................. 20
Miscellaneous	 ......................... 20
C3.3 Information Bit Rate
Two methods were used to determine the number of digital bits that could transmit
the required information content of the messages. First, it is assumed that the position
report and the other two ATC messages in a digital system would be formatted and coded.
Seven bits per alphanumeric character were used to allow for redundancy and coding.
Table C4 shows information required in the position report:
TABLE C4. — POSITION REPORT INFORMATION
Message Alphanumeric
Characters
Bits
Identification 3 21
Time 4 28
Heading 3 21
Latitude 4 28
Longitude 4 28
Altitude 3 21
Next position 8 56
ETA 4 28
Total 33 231
For the position report, 230 bits were used as a possible code. The other two messages
contain 60 bits each.
For the noncoded messages, it is assumed that a straight alphanumeric transmission
is required. However, a 50% reduction of the voice redundancy was assumed. For example,
a typical aircraft traffic advisory from ATC would take 7 seconds (excluding access, etc.)
This would be 17 words at 2.5 words per second. At four alphanumeric characters per
word this message would be 68 characters—assuming 34 to eliminate redundancy, with 7
bits per character, a figure of 250 bits was selected.
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C3.4 Message Frequency
The number of each type of message expected during a busy hour must now be
determined. This is a function of the number of airplanes and the ATC procedure used.
The number of airplanes in the communications gap was selected as 131 (68 subsonic and
63 supersonic) from the traffic analysis described previously. Using present procedures,
a subsonic airplane makes 1 position report per hour, while a Concorde and Boeing SST
would make 2 and 3 position reports per hour respectively. The position reports made
by these airplanes during the busy hour would be (68 x 1) + (50 x 3) + (13 x 2) or 244.
Also taking into account position reports made by the airplanes crossing at 10 0 W and
50° W, the total number of position reports during busy hour is 300. During the busy
hour, 63 supersonics and 30 subsonics would be expected to cross from one control to
another. This would generate 100 clearance control messages.
The results of this analysis are summarized in table C5. The increases in communi-
cations traffic postulated for the communications satellite case are based on an assumption
that the satellite system will tend to produce loads similar to those identified in ref. 3.
C4.0 DELAY ANALYSIS
There are two approaches that could be used to arrive at the required number of
channels for a satellite terminal. One approach is to remove the uncertainties from the
system and define it within certain constraints. Equations could be formulated to repre-
sent this system and solved to yield the optimal solution. The second approach is to simu-
late the message-arrival process at the terminal where the variables are generated by using
certain statistical rules; the optimal system is obtained by defining required system criteria.
The second approach rather than the first one was adopted for this study for the
following reasons:
(1) The simulation technique is a more realistic approach, because it affords an
opportunity to simulate the actual system very closely.
(2) The mathematic techniques are not yet fully developed to simulate mathe-
matical equations that could closely represent the actual system.
(3) It is easier to see how accurate and reliable the solution is when using the
simulation technique.
C4.1 Program Description
The following assumptions were used in developing the computer program required
for this task.
The system under consideration employs a satellite with a limited number of
communications channels n. Messages arrive at the satellite Poisson-distributed over a
period of 1 hour. Only the peak traffic hour is investigated. It is assumed that message
traffic routed to any ground station behaves identically to traffic routed to other ground
stations; therefore, only one communication,; link is considered. Furthermore, it is
assumed that:
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(1) Messages that arrive at the satellite are Poisson distributed.
(2) No delay is caused by the operation of the ground station.
(3) Messages are assigned channels with no delay in operation.
(4) The airplanes are continuously informed of their transmission possibilities.
(5) One message occupies one channel at one time.
(6) Channels are assigned on priority basis only.
(7) A message is allowed to complete its transmission even though another
message of higher priority now requests use of the channel in the trans-
mission period of time.
(g )	 Messages of same priority are assigned channels on a "first come first
served" basis.
(9)	 The only delay occurring in the system is that from messages having to
wait because channels are occupied.
C4.2 Program Details
It is assumed that message arrival times at the terminal have a Poisson distribution.
Subroutine POISS employs a random generator to create a random number that, in turn,
determines the number of messages arriving in a certain time interval. Each time interval in
the program is defined as a time unit that can be of any length. For instance, for a case of
taking a sample every 10 seconds for 1 hour, each time unit is equivalent to 10 seconds and
there are 360 time units in the entire period. Subroutine PRIM assigns priority and message
length to each message. Available channels are assigned to the message with high priority.
Among those of the same priority, the rule of "first come first served" is observed. But the
high-priority message does not interrupt the transmission of a low-priority message. It must
wait until a channel is available. Program DELAY analyzes the message delay with respect
to different numbers of channels as specified by the initial number of channels NCHANL,
channel increment NDCHNL, and the number of cases NCASE that are read into the pro-
gram. Program DELAY may also repeat the analysis with different sets of random numbers
as specified by the user through the number of sets of random numbers NRANDM and the
input arguments (IU's, IX's) of the random-number generator that are input data to the pro-
gram. The program can handle messages of up to four different priorities. The number of
messages of any one priority shall not exceed 3000. There may not be a channel avail-
able when a messaa-_ arrives; thus, a queueing table categorized in different priorities is
needed as a temporary parking place for the arriving messages. Each priority category of
the queueing table has a capacity of 500. Since a random-number generator is employed
in simulating the message distribution, accuracy depends upon the total number of
messages and their distribution. The confidence factor in the answer obtained is a func-
tion of the number of runs made to obtain the data.
C4.2.1 Subroutines. — This program contains three special-purpose subroutines
and one general-purpose subroutine, which were obtained from the Boeing Computing
Department Library:
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(1) Subroutine SHIFT — This subroutine advances every element of a single-
subscripted array by one place, except the first element i n the original
array. The first element will be destroyed. This subroutine can operate
on two arrays simultaneously.
(2) Subroutine POISS — Based on a Poisson distribution, this subroutine gener-
ates the number of messages arriving at a certain time. The number will be
between zero and 10.
(3) Subroutine PRIG — Based on a given distribution, this subroutine picks a
number among 1, 2, 3, and 4. This number represents the priority of a
message.
(4) Subroutine RAND — This is a random-number generator that generates a
random number from 0.0 to 1.0.
C4.2.2 Program logic.— The logic diagrams are included in fig. C I.
C4.2.3 Output. —The computer prints out the number of messages of each
priority that have been processed within the given time period. The input number of
total messages is also listed as a reference. The message delays are tabulated in four col-
umns of different priorities. The average message delay of each priority is presented at the
the bottom of the table. The messages that have not been processed during the given time
period (if there are any) are also listed as special cautions at the end of the output.
C5.0 RESULTS
The computer program described in the last section was used to obtain the message-
delay statistics for various numbers of channels and operational concepts. The frequency
of messages by message category for these concepts was selected from the results detailed
in table C5.
C5.1 Operational Concepts
The improved communications that a satellite will provide the ATC system can be
used in varying ways. Each concept requires different message-loading characteristics and
thus different capacities. To evaluate the effects of this variation, the concepts described
in the following paragraphs were used.
C5.1.1 Present procedures.— The North Atlantic ATC system requires position
reports every 100 of longitude, as detailed previously (table C5). This requires 300
position reports and 100 clearance-control messages for the high 1980 traffic estimate.
The total message load by priority is as follows:
First priority ............... 45
ATC messages .............. 400
Advisory messages .......... 50
Unclassified ................ 110
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Integer: D1, D2, D3, D4, DELAYI, DELAY2, DELAYS, DELAY4
TIN1, TIN2, TIN3, TIN4, CHANEL
200
READ PER (I) the percentage distribution
IS
EO = 5	 STOP	 END
7
READ	 NTIME = Total number of time units
NCHANL =	 Initial number of channels
NTOTAL = Total number of messages
NDCHNL =	 Channel increment
NCASE =	 Number of cases with different number of channels
NRANDM = Number of routine runs
MESLEN (1) =	 Array of message lengths
ITIME =clock DO LOOP 56 repeats so many timesDO
IRANDM = 1,, NRANDM to evaluate with different sets
L1 of random numbers
L2 Message-length table
L3 (by priority)
L4
READ IX,IU
D1
D2 Number of messages have D0 80 D0 LOOP 80 repeats so many times
'I	D3 been processed
I
KK = 1. NCASE as to compute all cases with
D4 different number of channels
ITIME
	 = 0
L1=L2= L3=L4=0
D1=D2=D3=D4=0
D0 30
II = 1, NCHANL
CHANEL 111) = 0
30
CONTINUE
A
Figure Cl.— COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAM LOGIC DIAGRAM
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Figure Cl.— Continued
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BDO 20
J - JASIGN, NCHANL
YESIS
CHANEL IJ) _
7
NO
JASIGN = J + 1	 20
MARK -	 I	 I CONTINUE
IS	 YES
MARK - 0
7
	
NO	 89
IS	 YES
L1 = 0
7
	
NO	 C
CHANEL IJ) - MESAGI 111
D1=D1+1
DELAYI (01) - ITIME - TIN1 Il ►
L1=L1-1
YES	 IS
L1=0
7
I NO
CALL SUBROUTINE SHIFT
Advance every first-priority message
in the message table by one place
Figure C I. — Continued
19
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Figure Cl.—  Continued
96
Figure Cl.—  Continued
97
0Figure Cl.—  Concluded
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A minimum airplane traffic load was also postulated. This led to an estimate of
55 subsonic and 21 supersonic airplanes. The subsonics would generate about 50 position
reports and the supersonics, 0. Also, about 30 clearance control messages would be
expected. The following is an estimated minimum message load with the other categories
also reduced by the reduction in traffic:
First priority ................. 40
ATC messages .............. 120
Advisory messages ........... 40
Unclassified ................ 80
This load is believed to represent an absolute minimum requirement.
C5.1.2 Increased position reports.— In this concept, position reports were increased
to every 5 0 of longitude. The number of position reports with this concept increased from
300 to 500. The other numbers were kept the same as the first concept.
C5.1.3 Automatic digital position reports.— In this concept, it is assumed that a
digital position reporting capability is available and that position reports are made every
3 minutes. This requires about 1.500 position reports to be transmitted in the peak hour
at 225 bits per report for a total of 562 x 10 3 bits. The other (voice) messages were kept
at the same number.
C5.1.4 All-digital system—U.S. message load.— In this concept, all messages are
in digital form, and an increased number of messages are assumed (reference last column of
table C5). The total message load by priority is given in table C6.
TABLE C6. — U.S. MESSAGE LOAD -- ALL-DIGITAL SYSTEM
Message Number Bits
First priority 140 96 x 103
ATC messages 2700 574 x 103
Advisory messages 135 32 x 103
Unclassified 270 124 x 103
C_5.1.5 Surveillance function—present procedures.— This concept has the same
voice message load as the first two concepts with high airplane traffic, except that addition
of a surveillance capability is assumed to eliminate the need for position reports.
C5.1.6 Surveillance function—U.S. message load.— The final concept examined
is a U.S.-type ATC message load with no position reports (surveillance). This concept uses
the voice message loading specified in the last column of table C5:
First priority ............. 140
ATC messages ............. 200
Advisory messages ..........135
Unclassified ...............270
Table C7 summarizes these message distributions.
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C5.2 Delay Results
The total messages in table C7 were run through the computer simulation described
previously with various numbers of channels. The selection of the required number of
channels was made based on the following outputs of the simulation.
Average delay ............. All messages
Average delay ............. First-priority messages
Maximum delay ........... First-priority messages
The maximum-delay value is the average worst-case delay for 100 computer runs.
It was found that 100 runs provided consistent results for these parameters and that addi-
tional runs made no significant changes in the results.
The procedure used to select the required number of channels can be seen from
table C8. This details the delay criteria above for both the selected channel numbers and
for one channel less than the selected number. The resulting number of channels in table
C8 satisfy three conditions:
(1) The average delay for all messages was kept below 20 seconds.
(2) The average delay of first-priority messages was kept below 1 second.
(3) The worst-case delay for first-priority messages was kept at approximately
10 seconds or less.
Table C9 illustrates this process. In the table, an X indicates that the delay figure
meets the criterion and a zero indicates a failure to meet the criterion. It can be seen that
only the selected channel requirements meet all three. For example, in concept 6 with
four channels, only the third criterion `ailed; whereas in concept lb with six channels,
none of the criteria was fulfilled. Adding additional channels over the number selected
did not produce a significant gain in operating effectiveness.
Figure C2 is presented as a typical example of the distributions of the average
delay obtained in the simulation. This shows the cumulative probability curves for the
five-channel and 4-channel runs of concept 6 (the surveillance function added with U.S.
message load). The curves are drawn for the first-priority messages. The average delay
for all first-priority messages was 0.19 second for five channels and 0.75 second for four
channels. The distribution was obtained from 100 computer runs. The added benefit
obtained from five channels is apparent from considering the two curves. For example,
the reduction in spread (or standard deviation) of the five-channel curve would permit a
five-channel system to operate with more predictable operating characteristics than a four-
channel system. Consider that while the average delay for the two systems differs by 0.75
0.19 = 0.56 second, the 99% average delay difference is approximately 1.69 - 0.69 = 1.00
second. This condition is generally true for all the selected channel numbers over the next
lower numbers. However, a similar condition does not exist for the next higher number of
channels.
Using the procedure described above, the required number of channels was selected
for all concepts defined. Table C10 presents a summary of the requirements with the
associated delays obtained in the simulation.
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TABLE C8. -- DELAY RESULTS
Run
number
(a)
Number
of
channels
Average
delay
(all messages),
seconds
Average
delay
(first priority),
seconds
Maximum
delay
(first priority),
seconds
(b)
1a
3 14.80 2.15 18.6
d4 2.58 0.58 10.6
1b
6 42.23 1.20 12.4
d7 8.05 0.52 9.3
2
8 54.86 0.86 11.3
dg 11.39 0.30 7.5
C3
2 22.86 --- ---
d3 2.89 --- ---
c4 3 12.07 1.73 13.4
d4 2.29 0.42 6.9
5
2 8.41 1.36 16.2
d3 1.24 0.20 6.0
6
4 15.12 0.75 14.4
d5 2.83 0.19 9.6
a From table C4
bFor digital messages
cAverage worst delay for 100 runs
dSelected number of channels
-- ---	 -	 X ---
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TABLE C9. -- CHANNEL SELECTION
Run
number Channels
Criteriab
1 2 3
1a 3 X 0
0
a4 X X X
lb 6 0 0 0
a7 X X X
2 8 0 X 0
a9 X X X
3
2 0 --- ---
53 X --- ---
4
3 X 0 0
a4 X X X
5
2 X 0 0
a3 X X X
6 4 X
X 0
55 X X X
aSelected number of channels
b X = Criterion met
O = Criterion failed
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APPENDIX D
NAVIGATION/SURVEILLANCE MODELS
D1.0 INTRODUCTION
This appendix discusses the mathematical details of two Boeing-developed models
that were used to determine the position-fixing requirements specified in Sec. 4.0. A
collision-risk model based on work at the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) (refs. 4,
11, and 12) is used to quantify the basic safety criteria. This mcdel is fed path-keeping
parameters from an air traffic control surveillance model based on superimposing a sur-
veillance capability on the airplane's self-contained navigation capability.
D2.0 COLLISION-RISK MODEL
The collision-risk model is oriented toward a long-range air traffic control system
such as exists over the enroute portion of the North Atlantic air route. In this type of
system, the collision risk (number of expected collisons) between two aircraft becomes
significant only when they enter into what is called "proximity." Proximity is defined as
a condition in which the aircraft are nominally separated in only one dimension (lateral,
longitudinal, or vertical separation).
In this analysis, the equations are derived only for the lateral-risk case, which is
the collision risk due to the failure of lateral separation between two aircraft that are
nominally at the same altitude and that are both contained within the same along-track
separation segment. Figure D1 shows this condition, which is called "lateral proximity."
This is a reasonable limitation since the navigation and surveillance parameters
being specified are most critical in maintaining this separation situation safely.
D2.1 Mathematical Derivation
The lateral collision risk Cy can be expressed as a function of the following
parameters:
(1) The total time during which the aircraft are laterally proximate—This time
is determined from the amount of traffic, the area of the traffic routes,
the ATC procedures, the transit time, and the total time period. The time
must be calculated for same-direction traffic Tys and opposite-direction
traffic Tyo.
(2) The probability of vertical overlap of proximate aircraft PZo and the
frequency with which vertical overlap occurs N Zo—These parameters
are evaluated for aircraft at nominally the same altitude. They depend on
the aircraft vertical thickness, the vertical separation standard, and the alti-
tude variations of the aircraft.
(3) The along-track separation standard Sx—This parameter does not enter
d irectly into the final result in the collision-risk computation. In the form
in which the model has been developed, the proximity values defined pre-
viously are determined as a function of Sx. This permits Sx to be
canceled out from the final equation.
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L
Sy
2 SX
(a) Same Direction
I—SY
	 ACROSS-TRACK SEPARATION STANDARD
7
2 SX
— — -- — — ALONG-TRACK SEPARATION
(b) Opposite Direction
FIGURED 1.— LATERAL PROXIMITY
(4)	 The aircraft parameters. The following terms are contained in the model
•	 Average velocity V
•	 Mean cruising speed difference for same-direction proximate pairs AV
•	 Aircraft dimensions, N x> X y
•	 Relative across-track velocity I y l
The velocity parameters are really random variables whose distribution
functions must be determined from actual operational observations. In
the present evaluation, an expected value is used based on l,lanned SST
design parameters and on observed subsonic values.
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(5)	 The probability of across-track overlap of laterally proximate ai--Aaft Py.
This parameter is the critical one as far as specification of navigation
accuracy is concerned, because collisions are possible only wh.;n error
magnitudes of at least half the separation standard occur. Frrors this large
fall in the tail area of typical navigation system position error distributions.
Therefore, the proportion of errors falling in the tail area determines the
relative effectiveness of navigation systems in reducing collision risk.
Figure D2 shows the error distribution for Gaussian and exponential
assumptions about the shape of the main body of errors. Also plotted
are observed values of Project Accordion (ref. 13) data. All these distribu-
tions have a standard deviation of 12 n .mi. The variation of tail area
proportions is apparent from this graph. The exponential assumption is
used in the analysis presented here.
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FIGURE D2.— TAIL AREA OF ERROR DISTRIBUTIONS
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The collision risk (Cy = number of collisions) as a function of this
probability anc using the preceding notation becomes:
,
Cy	 Tys O V	 XxPzo Y
P  = 
gX_ 2 
Pzo + xNzo +	 2A 
+ Tyo V P +A N	
+ ^xPzo^Y^
g	 zo	 x zo	 2^
x	 y
The detailed derivation of this equation follows.
D2.2 Mathematical Basis
The derivation presented here provides sufficient background to the model used to
enable judgments to be made of the validity of the results. A mathematically rigorous ex-
position has not been attempted. Rather than reproduce the total step-by-step evolution
of the equations as contained in the referenced RAE papers, a summary of the logic involved
is presented. Full details of tho mathematics are contained) in refs. 4 and 12. The symbols
used are those defined previously in Sec. 2.1.
The general assumptions are:
1. Blind flying; that is, evasive action based on visibility is not taken.
2. Position determination errors in three dimensions are independent.
3. Collisions occur only between aircraft flying wi& separation intended in
only one dimension. This assumption defines the term `dangerously
small" to be a proximity condition as described in fig. DI.
In general (see ref. 4), the collision rate due to collisions from a particular direction
can be stated as the product of three terms: the frequency with which the separation in that
direction becomes dangerously small multiplied by the proportion of time spent with separa-
tion dangerously small in each of the other directions. Matt_ematically:
(CR)y = NyPZPx
Where: x, y, z = the along-track, across-track, and the vertical axes, respectively
(CR)y = collision rate due to intrusions . from both sides
Ny	 = frequency of lateral overlap of two aircraft nominally provided
lateral separation
Pz	 = probability of vertical overlap of two aircraft at nominally the
same altitude
Px	 = probability of longitudirJ overlap of two aircraft within nominally
the same along-track separation segment
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In a similar manner, collision rates from intrusions in front and back and on top and
bottom can be written as (CR)x = NxPyPz or (CR)z = NzPyPx with appropriate
subscript changes.
The total collision rate becomes
CR = NxPyPz + NzPxPy + NyPzPx	 (Dl)
The problem now becomes one of defining the frequencies and probabilities in a way
that will develop an explicit expression containing all the parameters of interest.
We will consider the case of collisions due to breakdown of planned lateral separation
since this condition is mostly the result of navigation errors. In this case, the y sub-
script terms of eq. (Dl) are defined for aircraft flying with nominally lateral separation.
The x and z subscript terms are defined for aircraft with nominally the same longitude
and altitude.
For this case, the following relationships hold (these relationships assume that the aircraft
are uniformly distributed in the along-track direction):
Px	 Ax/Sx
Nx = I z /2Sx
Where:	 Ax	 = aircraft length
Sx	 = along-track separation standard
I k I	 = average rate of charge of the along-track separation
The average rate of change of x assumes two values:
	 z = 2V for opposite-direction
traffic and I k I = AV for same-direction traffic, where: V is the average velocity and
QV is the average relative velocity.
Substituting these values into eq. (D 1) results in two equations:
AV	 x^xCR(same) = 22 Sx Pz Py + Sx Nz Py + Sx N y P 
_ V	 Ax	 Xx
CR(opp) —	 Sx
 Pz PY + S
	
Nz PY + Sx 11Y Pzx
The frequency of lateral overlap of laterally proximate aircraft N Y can be expressed in
terms of its probai 'lity of occurrence, the rate of lateral change. and the aircraft wingspan.
NY = 2.Yy Py (ref. 4)
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	Where:
	 I y I = rate of lateral change
Ay = wingspan
Substituting and rearranging terms
1 OV	 ^x
CR(same) S
	
2 Pz + X x Nz + 2 ^ Pz Y PYTX_ y
CR(opp) — 1	 V Pz + AxNz + Ax Pz Y	 P Sx 	2A y
The collision risk due to lateral separation failure Cy is the total collision rate multiplied
by the time spent in proximity
Cy
 = (Tys) CR(same) + (Tyo) CR(opp)
where Tys and Tyo are the same-direction times and opposite-direction times,
respectively.
Finally we arrive at the expression on page 110.
CY  Tys OV^xPzo^Y) TYo
	
2 Pzo + AxNzo + 2a
	 +	 V PzO +AxNzo + 21	
(D2)
	
Py
	Sx	 y	 S x	 y
where the subscript zo indicates that these parameters are evaluated at nominally zero
altitude separation.
D3.0 AIR TRAFFIC, CONTROL SURVEILLANCE MODEL
This section describes the development and application of a mathematical model
with which to study the operational performance of overocean aircraft position-monitoring
systems. In developing the model, it was necessary to make some basic assumptions about
the system and its operation. The first assumption 's simply that the surveillance system
will be used by ATC to regulate the flow of air traffic.
The second assumption concerns the nature of the control action exercised by ATC.
It is assumed that the control of aircraft will be accomplished as follows: An alarm
threshold ro is defined about each aircraft's intended track. AP.. alarm occurs when an
aircraft exceeds its alarm threshold "i.e., when it wanders a distan::e greater than ± ro
from intended track) as determines by surveillance. The occurrence of an alarm requires
ATC to direct the pilot to alter his course appropriately. In the absence of an alarm, no
control action is taken.
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The third assumption is one of independence. We assume that the surveillance
position information is independent of the individual aircraft navigation systems.
We make no additional assumptions as to the type of surveillance system except to charac-
terize it by its accuracy Up and update interval to. The term vµ represents the
standard deviation of the surveillance system error distribution, and to represents the
time interval (per aircraft) uetween successive surveillance fixes.
The parameters that are used to measure operational performance of the sur-
veillance system are
(1) Al.,rm rate Al
(2) "Unfavorable" alarm rate Ai (An "unfavorable" alarm is defined as an alarm
that would move an aircraft farther away from its intended track.)
( ^)	 Probability of overlap Pr
The --e
 parameters are measures of ATC workload and overall safety levels.
Parameters Ai and Ai are diretly related to the probability of alarm PA and the
probability of "unfavorable." alarm PA._ Thus, the performance parameters may be
expressed as functions of Pr, PA, and PA. Our primary concern is to develop appropri-
ate mathematical expressions for these three quantities.
D3.1 Preliminary Considerations
Let us postulate a system in which all aircraft must be separated in at least one of
the three dimensions (i.e., longitudinal, lateral, or vertical). We shall denote the magnitude
of the nominal separation in each of these dimensions as Sx, Sy, and Sz respectively.
Suppose that we stop time and examin.; the probability that any two aircraft will overlap
in the rth dimension where r may take on any of the values x, y. or z. We shall denote
the nominal separation in the rth dimension as Sr.
The situation is depicted in fig. D3. The probability density function of the air-
craft track-keeping errors about the aircraft's intended track will be denoted f(r) for
aircraft No. 1 and g(r) for aircraft No_ 2. The point r = 0 will be taken as the
center of symmetry for mathematical simplicity. The probability that aircraft No. 1 is
centered between r and r + dr is
f (r+r)dr
`` 2
The probability of aircraft No. 2 overlapping aircraft No. 1 is
r+L S
rf
g/r - 2 dr
r-L
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Sr	 r = o	 Sr
r = -2	 r =2
FIGURE D3.— PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS OF AIRCRAFT POSITION ERRORS
Where: L = Al + A2
2
Al = physical size of aircraft No. 1 in the rth dimension
A 2 = physical size of aircraft No. 2 in the rth dimension
The probability of an overlap occurring when aircraft No. I is between r and r+dr is
r + L
f(r+2r j dr I	 g( µ- 2r ) dµ
r 
The total probability of overlap is
S	 r+L Sr	 (D 3)Pr = f(r+ r) B(µ- —) dµ dr
_00	 2	 r-L	 2
A useful approximation to eq. (D3) may be made if we assume that second-order variations
in g(r) are small over the interval r-L to r+L. With this assumption we have:
f
r+L_	 S
9(JA2r) d1A - 2 L g (r- 2r)
r-L
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Thus, eq. (D3) becomes
Pr - 2L f
CO
 f (r + Sr g (r - Sr ) dr	 (D4)
2)	 2
If the two aircraft are the same size (i.e., XI = A 2 = 7k r) and their track-keeping error
distributions are the same [i.e., f(r) = g(r) ] , then eq. (D4) becomes:
CD
Pr ^ 2a r f ^frf- Ir- fCr - Sr
/
dr	 (DS)
 
2 )
	 2
Equations (D3), (D4), and (D5) represent the probability of overlap between two aircraft
in any of the three dimensions where Sx, Sy, and Sz are the nominal separations
between the aircraft at a given instant in time. The terms f(r) and g(r) represent the
probability density functions of the aircraft track-keeping errors. In extending this
analysis to the problem of calculating overall collision rate for a system of aircraft, the
time derivatives of S x , Sy, and Sz must also be considered. For example, the prob-
abilities indicated in eqs. (D3), (D4), and (D5) are valid for a single instant in time only.
Since Sx, Sy, and Sz are functions of time in an actual system, the probability of
overlap between any two aircraft must be considered over the entire time interval for
which the two aircraft are close enough to contribute a significant collision risk. T'-e
collision risk for each pair of aircraft must then be summed over the entire region to
provide the overall collision rate. Such a summation roast take into consideration the
type and number of aircraft in the system as well as the routes over which those aircraft
will fly. The problem of calculating overall collision rate has been considered in Sec. D2.0
and will not be considered further here. The parameter that will be used in the following
analysis as a measure of collision risk is the probability of overlap in th.; rth dimension
(i.e. Pr).
D3.2 A Surveillance System
Suppose now that ATC. uses a surveillance system to monitor the positions of all
air traffic. An aircraft is allowed to navigate without interference using its own independent
navigation system sinless its position as determined by surveillance falls outside a distance
±ro from its intended track. The occurrence of this situation will be denoted as an alarm
(ro will be called the alarm threshold). If an alarm occurs, the aircraft will be directed to
return to its intended track according to the position fix indicated by the surveillance system.
Consider fig. D4. Let us denote the probability density function for the aircr,-.ft
track-keeping errors just before a surveillance fix as f(r) and the probability density
function for the surveillance system errors as h(µ). The random variable r represents
the aircraft position relative to its intended track, and P represents the aircraft position
indicated by the surveillance system relative to the actual aircraft position. We will take
the point r = 0 to be the aircraft's intended track.
The probability of an alarm at r, denoted as Pa(r), is equal to the probability that
µ Nvill occur in the interval r2 z r02 ; thus
-(r+To)
	
w
Pa (r) = f h (14) d µ+ f h (µ) dµ	 (D6)CO
' 	 - (r - ro)
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PA _a.._1
r=-ro
	r = o
	 r=ro
µ = (r+ro) µ = - r	 µ = - (r-ro)
FIGURE D4.— ERROR DISTRIBUTIONS OF NAVIGATION AND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS
Conversely, the probability that an alarm will not occur at r, Pa' (r), is
- (r-ro)
Pa ^(r) _
^ (r+ro)
h(µ) dµ
	
(D7)
Notice that
Pa' (r)	 1 — Pa (r)	 (Dg)
The probability that an alarm will occur between r and r+dr is equal to the probability
of r between r and r+dr times the probability of an alarm at r, or
Pa (r) f (r) dr
The overall probability of an alarm PA is then
00
P 1, = fpa  (r) f (r) dr
	 (D9)
_ ,o
where Pa (r) is defined by eq. (D6).
Another parameter of considerable interest is the probability of an alarm that will cause
the aircraft to move to a less favorable position (i.e., farther away from its intended track).
We shall call this parameter FA (probability of an unfavorable alarm). To find an
expression for PA we must first consider the various circumstances under which such a
condition might arise.
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D3.2.1 Case 1. - Consider the case in which the aircraft lies between r = - oo and
r = - ro/2. An alarm would move the aircraft to a less favorable position if the surveyed
position falls in the interval µ = -	 to µ = 2r or in the interval µ = - (r-ro)
to P = -.  Thus,
2r	 ,o
Pa (r) = f h(µ)d µ + f h(µ)dµ where-aos r s - ro	(D10)
-00
	 -(r - ro)	 2
D3.2.2 Case 2. - In the interval r = - 2 to r = 2 , an unfavorable alarm
would occur for a surveyed position between k = - ao and u = - (r+ro) or between
µ = - (r-r(,) and µ = co . Thus
(r+ro)	 ,o
Pa (r) =	 rh(µ)du + fh(P)diA  where- 2 5 r s
	 (Dl 1)
^-
-(r-ro)
D3.2.3 Case 3. - In the interval r =LO 	r = a , an unfavorable alarm would
2
occur for a surveyed position between µ = - and µ = - (r + r o) or between u = 2r
and µ =	 Thus,
Pa (r) = f h(µ)dµ + fh (µ)dµ where 2 s r sao	 (D12)
°O	 2 r
The probability of an unfavorable alarm occurring between r and r + dr is
f (r) Pa
 (r) dr
The overall probability of an unfavorable alarm is
PA
 = f f (r) Pa (r) dr	 (D 13)
_Go
where Pa(r) is defined in piecewise fashion by eqs. (D10), (D11), and (D12).
Consider now a single instant in time after the surveillance fix. As before, assume
that prior to the fix all aircraft were distributed according to f(r) and that all aircraft
which received an alarm have moved to their assigned positions. The system operates so
that all aircraft receiving alarms are redistributed about their intended tracks according to
the probability density function h(r). All aircraft not receiving an alarm will be distri-
buted about their intended tracks according to the probability density function
Pa ' (r)
1 _PA f(r)	 (D14)
The probability density function of the aircraft position errors after the sur-
veillance fix will be equal to the probability density function for the aircraft that
received an alarm h (r) times the fraction of aircraft receiving an alarm PA plus the
probability density function for the aircraft not receiving an alarm [eq. (D14) ] times
the fraction of aircraft not receiving an alarm I-P A . Thus the probability density function
F(r) after the surveillance fix is
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F (r) = PA
 h(r) + Pa ' (r) f(r)
	 (D15)
It may be easily verified that this expression is an admissible probability density
function in that	 gof F(r)dr	 1	 (D16)
 — co
Thus we have established a very useful result. Equation (D15) is an expression for
the probability density function of the aircraft track-keeping errors after a surveillance fix
as a function of the error distribution before the fix. Equations (D9) and (D 13) respec-
tively define the probability of an alarm and the probability of an "unfavorable" alarm.
D3.3 Steady-State Surveillance Equations
Although the equations developed in the previous section are very interesting, we
would like to develop expressions for F(r), PA, and FA when the system has reached a
steady-state condition (i.e., after the surveillance system has been in operation for quite
some time). The final solution will take into account the aircraft drift between successive
surveillance fixes. This will best be accomplished by first examining the system for the
situation in which we assume the aircraft do not drift between surveillance fixes.
Let us consider the surveillance system as an "operator" on the aircraft distribution
function. Each time a surveillance fix is taken, some of the aircraft are removed fron, the
tails of the distribution and redistributed about their intended tracks according to h(r).
This section will develop an expression for the probability density function of the aircraft
track-keeping errors under steady-state conditions in the absence of aircraft drift.
Immediately before the first surveillance fix we shall assume that the aircraft are
distributed according to f(r), where f(r) now represents the probability density function
of the aircraft track-keeping errors in the absence of surveillance. The following parameters
are defined: PAn is the probability of alarm for the nth surveillance fix and Fn(r) is the
probability density function of the aircraft track-keeping errors after the nth surveillance fix.
For the first surveillance fix we have, .	 . eq. (D 9),
PA 1 = f Pa (r) f(r) dr	 (D 17)
_,o
Let us abbreviate PA  as PA. From eq. (D15) we may write
F 1 (r) = PAh (r) + Pa ' (r) f(r)
	 (D 18)
For the second surveillance fix we notice that 'Pa (r) and Pa '(r) [eqs. (D6) and (D7)]
remain unchanged regardless of the n and, therefore, eq. (139) becomes
PA2 = f Go Pa
 (r) F, (r) dr	 (D19)
_00
or
PA2 = PA f Pa (r) h (r) dr + f Pa (r) Pa ' (r) f (r) dr
	 (D20)
_00
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Substituting eq. (D8) into this expression yields
00
PA2	 PA f  Pa (r) h (r) dr + f Pa (r) f (r) dr - f Pat (r) f (r) dr	 (D21)
— oo	 _	
— oo
	 — oo
Digressing briefly, let us examine the function Pa (r) shown, qualitatively, in
fig. D5. Ideally we would like this function to be a step function having a value of zero
within a distance ± ro of intended track and a value of one outside these limits. Pa (r)
approaches this ideal function as the variance of h (P) becomes small. More precisely
w^ may state that the shape of Pa (r) approaches a step function as the ratio ro /Qµ
b°- omes large, where ap is the standard deviation of h(µ). Thus it would appear that
a highly accurate surveillance system is desirable. If this is the case and P a (r) may
indeed be approximated by a unit step function, then Pa2 (r) approaches this same
function and eq. (D21) becomes
PA2 1 PA f  Pa (r) It (r) dr	 (D22)
_,0
- ro	 ro	 ro
(a)
-j-
--om- Large
l+
ro	 ro	 ro(b)	
o	
--0. Small
Il
FIGURE D5.— Pa(r) VERSUS roluM
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For a reasonably designed surveillance system it is obvious that
00	 00
f Pa (r) h (r) dr	
s1 Pa (r) f (r) dr = PA	(D23)
_ 
eo	
_ 00
and thus eq. (D22) becomes
PA2 !g 	 (D2^;
As a pessimistic estimate for PA2 we shall assume
PA2 = PA 2
	(D25)
Now, according to eq. (D15), we may write
F2(r) = PA2 h(r) + Pa' (r) F1 (r)	 (D26)
However, noting our approximation for PA2 [eq. (D25)] and substituting eq. (D18)
for F l (r), we obtain
F2
 (r) , PA 2 h (r) + PAPa ' (r) h(r) + Pa (r)2 f(r) (D27)
If we repeat this line of reasoning using the sam^, approximations, it may be ultimately
shown that
Fn
 (r) -- PA 11 h (r) + pAn- 1 Pa I (r) h (r) + PA n-2 Pa ' (r) 2 h(r)
n-i	 n-1
+ ... + PAi Pa '(r) h(r) + ... + PA Pa ' (r) h(r)
n
+ Pa ' (r) f(r)	 (D28)
The relative shapes of the various functions appearing in eq. (D28) are sketched in fig. D6.
The effect of the surveillance system upon the aircraft track-keeping errors is to remove
aircraft from the tails of f (r) and redistribute them about their intended tracks accord-
ing to h (r). The terms Fn (r) and f (r) are shown comparatively in fig. D6(d).
Returning to eq. (D28), we notice that Fn (r) approaches zero for r2 z r 02 as
n becomes large. In addition, if PA << 1 and if Pa' (r) approaches a unit step
function, then Fn (r) approaches zero for r2 ? ro 2 even for small values of n, and
Fn (r) is approximated by f (r) for r2 s r02.
With these assumptions we may write:
where C is defined such that
Fn (s) - C f (r)	 r2 s r02
Fn (r) - 0	 r2 > r02
jo
C	 f (r) d (r) = 1
-ro
(D29)
(D30)
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- r 	 r 
(c)	 Pa '(r)
L /_1
- r 	 r 
(d) F n (r) and f(r)
FIGURE D6.— COMP.. RATI VE SHAPES OF VARIOUS FUNCTIONS
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D3.4 Aircraft Drift
We are now in a position to consider the case in which the aircraft are allowed to
drift between successive surveil!ance fixes. If we can assume that the relationships in eq.
(D29) are true in the absence of drift for small n (say n = 1 or 2), then it seems reason-
able to assume that immediately after a surveillance fix, the relationships in eq. (D29) are
still approximately true even though the aircraft are allowed to drif` about between sur-
veillance fixes. Let the time interval between successive surveillance fixes be denoted by
to. Since the aircraft are assumed to drift between surveillance fixes, the distribution of
the aircraft track-keeping errors will be a function of time and the aircraft will, in general,
be at their most unfavorable positions at the end of time interval to. The next surveillance
fix will then return the system to the state described by eq. (D % 9). To provide a pessimistic
estimate for Pr , we will calculate Pr, PA, and P A at the end of time interval to. To
accomplish this, we must first find the steady-state probability density function of the air-
craft track-keeping errors F(r) at the end of this same time interval to.
Let the probability density function for the aircraft drift errors at the end of
time to be denoted by G (r). The standard deviation of G (r) will be ar t
where vi is the standard deviation of the aircraft drift rate. The probability &nsity
function for the aircraft position errors excluding aircraft drift will be Fn (r) defined
by eq. (D29). The combined probability density function at the end of time to will
simply be the convolution of these two distributions, or
00
	F (r) = f Fn (s) G (r - s) ds	 (D31)
_,o
or equivalently
	
F(r) _ ! G(s) Fn (r - s) ds	 (D32)
Expressions for Pr, PA, and PA may now be written directly from eqs. (D5), (D9), and
(D13) as
Pr = 2 X r I F (r - Sr ) F (r Y Sr ) 6r	 (D33)
- a0	 2	 2
	
00	 00
PA = f F (r) Pa (r) d  , 2 J F (r) d  *
	 (D34)
	
-00
	 r0
a
	P A = f F (r) Pa (r) dr
	 (D35)
Where F(r) is defined by eqs. (D31) or (D32) and Pa (r) and Pa
 (r) are defined by
eqs. (D6), (D 10), (D 11), and (D 12
Remember that the conditions under which the above equations are valid are
PA « 1
and
ro -W large
vµ
*The latter expression is derived as eq. (D50).
(D36)
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In words, we may state these conditions as
(1) The probability of alarm for any given surveillance fix must be small.
For definiteness let us state:
PA s 10-2	(D37)
(2) The errors associated with the surveillance system must be small compared
to the alarm threshold. For definiteness let us state:
To
	
10	 (D38)
ap
Given f(r), h(µ), and G(r) and the assumptions of eqs. (D37) and
(D38), we are now in a position to calculate F(r), PA, PA , and °r
using eqs. (D31) through (D35).
D3.5 Applications
D3.5.1 The assumed probability density functions.— Before proceeding further
we must make some assumption about the probability density function of the aircraft
=
	
	 track-keeping errors and the surveillance errors. Historically, the Gaussian distribution
has been used to describe these errors. The data from many measurements taken over
the past few years indicate that, although the Gaussian distribution agrees quite closely
with experimental data within two to three standard deviations of the mean, the tails of
the distribution contain 20 to 100 times as many aircraft as would be predicted by the
Gaussian curve. Since the probability of overlap in a dimension where the nominal
separation is being enforced is very sensitive to the tails of the distribution function, the
Gaussian assumption tends to yield highly optimistic estimates of collision risk.
Two basic causes for the relatively large number of aircraft appearing in the tails
of the experimentally derived distribution functions are: (1) equipment failures and (2)
human errors. Such sources of error have been termed "blunders." Human error appears
to be an unusually prolific source of blunders with the navigation equipment used exten-
sively over the North Atlantic today.
The tails of the experimentally derived distribution functions strongly suggest the
exponential probability density function. Also, consider that future navigation systems
(nav/sat, inertial, etc.) will probably eliminate many of the human and equipment
blunders occurring today, because the new systems will have higher levels of automation
and higher reliability with solid-state microminiaturized equipment. In view of the above
statements it is believed that an accuracy specification for a future surveillance system
should be determined using the assumption that the tails of the error distribution for
such a system will not be worse than exponential.
Thus, a reasonable assumption for f(r) and h(µ) would be a probability density
function that is Gaussian shaped within two or three standard deviations of the mean and
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exponential beyond this limit. Such a distribution would be mathematically un; 4--ldy,
however, and so we shall approximate this distribution by the first Laplacian distribution,
that is,
1	 - v/2^ µr>-r ^ / Qr 	(1339)
f(r) _ ^- Orre
This function assumes that both the body and the tails are exponentially
distributed. The distribution provides an excellent compromise because:
(1) It is a mathematically tractable function
(2) Its cumulative distribution approximates the Gaussian distribution
between 1 . 5 and 2 standard deviations of the mean (see table DI)
(3) The tails of the distribution, are exponentially distributed
TABLE DI.— GAUSSIAN AND EXPONENTIAL CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION
FUNCTIONS
r/vr Gaussian Exponential
0.5 0.691 0.753
1.0 0.841 0.877
1.5 0.933 0.94C
2.0 0.977 0.970
2.5 0.994 0.984
3.0 0.999 0.993
For reasons stated in the preceeding paragraphs we shall choose the probability
density function for the aircraft navigation errors to be
- & I r	 (D40)
f(r)_ 
V/v 
e	
or
r
and likewise the probability density function for the surveillance system errors will be
_V2	hu1	 (1341)
h (µ) _ 
^^
1	 e	 o rto" - 0,,,o
In addition to these two distributions we must make an assumption on the
distrihution of the aircraft drift errors, that is, G(r). We will not attempt to justify a
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particular distribution for G(r), but in the absence of better information will arbitrar-
ily choose
4221
1	 _	 Irl
	 (D42)
G(r)	 e alto
V 2 aito
since this function is relatively easy to integrate.
The application of the model in the following section is valid for any dimension
insofar as eqs. (D40), (D41), and (D42) are valid. Since the observations that allowed
us to assume an exponential distribution function were based upon measureme p_ts of
track-keeping errors in the lateral dimension. our discussion of the results will be limited
to separation in the lateral dimension.
D3.5.2 Application of the model.- The remaining task is to evaluate eqs. (D31)
through (D35) for the assumed probability density functions of eqs. (D40), (1341), and
(1)421 ). The following discussion evaluates these equations one at a time and examines
each to see if there are any simplifying assumptions that may be made.
The steady-state probability density function: The probability density function for
the aircraft track-keeping errors at the end of time interval t o
 is given by eq. (D31) as
	
F(r) =	 JFn (s) G(r - s) ds	 (D43)
_,p
where, from eqs. (D29), (D40), and (D42):
_ ,T2 s
Fn (s) = 7j-67- e a r	 s2 < ro
	
v
	
r
Fn (s)= 0	 s2' o2	 (D44)
^r2	 Ir -sl	 (D45)
G (r-s) =tir2 t e Qr o
ro
f The convolution of eqs. (D44)and (D45), as indicated by eq. (D43), is evaluated
with the following result:
 [ -K'r	 -Kr	 - (K+K') ro -K'r	 - (K+K') ro +K'r
	
F (r) = C 4K Kae + Kbe - Kce	 - Kce	 0 s r s ro
CKK'	
-K 'r	
- (K+K') ro -K'r	 - (K-K') ro
 -K'r
F(r) = 4
	
Kae - Kce	 -Kde	 r i ro	 (D46)
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Where:
J2K = Q
r
. -2K _
tor
1C =
1- o
1 1_
Ka	 K+K + K-K'
	
1 
	 1
K _b	 k-+—K' -
 K-K'
__	 1
Kc K+K'
1
	
K	 (D47)
Probability of Alarm:
	
d	 K-K'
Combining eqs. (D6) and (D34), the probability of alarm
becomes:
- (r+ro)
OO
	
PA = f F(r)
1 -00
f h(µµ + f h(µµ	 dr	 (D48)
_,0
 - (r-ro)
where NO is defined by eq. (D41) and F(r) is defined by eqs. (D46) and (D47).
Equation (D48) is evaluated to yield
PA
_ CKK' ( Kd -Kc - Kb - 2Kd ` e -Kro
+
4	 K'+K"	 K• K" K' J 
2Ka Ka	Ka	 -K' ro.(	 e	 +
\	 K' K'+K" K'-K" )
Ka	 Kb	 Ka _ Kb	 - ro
1 K'+10 1 + K+K" + K'-K"	 K-K" e	 +
KC 	 Kb	 Kd	 -(K+2K")ro
K"-K	 K+K" K'+K" ) e	 +
K	 K	 2K	 -(K+2K' h
\ K'+K' + K'-K'	 Kc / e	
o	 (D49)
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where K" = f25
This expression yields larger than expected values of PA for small values of the
parameter a- t o . This is because the approximation for Fn(r), eq. (D29), does not accurately
describe the shape of the actual distribution in the immediate vicinity of the alarm threshold.
The resulting error in PA is not serious, however, except for small values of v. to* In order
to estimate PA for small a. to we may assume that PA is approximately equal to the frac-
tion of aircraft that drift beyond the limits of the steady-state probability density function
Fn(r) during the u pdate interval to . For the Fn(r) given by eq. (D29) this would simply be
PA !z-- 2 fF  (r) dr	 (D50)
ro
Equation (D50) is evaluated with the following :result:
PA x CK	 Kae -K'ro 
-KceKt
2K')ro-Kae ro
	 (D51)
2
For small values of v.
r 
t o , eq. (D51) provides an excellent approximation for P A. For
large values of v, t
	
eqs. (D49) and (D51) yield quite similar results.
r 
Probability of an unfavorable alarm: The probability of an unfavorable alarm is
defined by eq. (D35) as
PA = f Pa (r) F(r) dr	 (D52)
co
where F(r) is given by eqs. (D46) and (D47) and Pa (r) is given by eqs. (D 10), (D 11),
and (D12). Equation (D52) is evaluated with the following result:
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pA = CKK' r Ka +Kb
	 K +K
	
-K ►►ro
4	 I K, +K ►r + Ka K" b ) e	 +
Kb	 KcKb	 _ Kd	 Kd	 {K+21C") ro
" -K' _- K+K" + K	 K+2K"	 K'+K" K'+2K rr e	 +
Kc	 Kc	 - (K + — + K
r ►
" ) ro
K'+K" IC"-	
K r
K' e	 2	 2	 +
KaK► 	 {K'+ 32 ► ' ) ro - (2 ' + 32 ►, ) ro+K►► e	
- e	 +
Kb	 -(K+ 2 " ) ro	 - (2 + ZK ► r ) ro
K+Krr a	 -e	 +
K	 - (K+K") ro {K+ 32 ' + 2 " ) roK rr -K. e	 - e	
) +
1 _(N  + K 11) ro 	{ 2 +K") ro	 -(K - 2 - K") ro
K'+ 2 K►► Kae	 + Kbe	 -Kce	 +
_(K'+ 2') ro	 _ (2 + 2 ") ro
1
K' - K" _ Kae 	- Kbe	 (D53)
where K" =
µ
Probability of overlap: The probability of overlap is given by eq. (D33)
Pr = 2 Ar fF(.
- Sr) F(r+ sr) drCO
	
2	 2	 (D54)
If we substitute eq. (D46) for F(r) into eq. (D54), the resulting expression
becomes unmanageable; thus, a simplifying approximation for F(r) is in order. Suppose
we let Fn(r) [eq. (D44)]be approximated by a uniform distribution between ± ro.
This would provide a much simpler form for F(r) and would yield a more conserva-
tive estimate for Pr. Thus, in the interest of simplicity, eqs. (D44) and (D45) become
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F (s) = 1 -	 s 2 s r 2ri	 2ro	 0
(D55)
Fn(s) = 0	 s2 > ro2
-K" I r-s
G (r - s) = K e	 (D56)
2
F (r) now becomes, from eq. (D43),
ro
-K" jr-slds
F (r) f K" e	 (D57)
- ro
Oro
Equation (D57) is evaluated with the following result:
-K"(ro + r) -K"(ro - r)
F(r) = 1 (2-e  	 ) o s r s ro
4ro
1	 -K"r	 K"ro	-K"ro
F(r) _ — e	 ^e	 -e	 ,	 r ' ro	 (D58)
4ro
If K r,>2, eq. (D58) becc,nes
F(r) = 1 ` 2-e	 -e	 ,	 0 s r< ro
4ro
-K"(r-ro)
F(r) ^ 4r
	
e	 r > ro	(D59)
0
Using this expression for F(r), eq. (D54) is evaluated with the following result:
7X r	 Sr	 -K"(Sr - 2ro)
_	 3
Pr = 4r02	 2 - ro - 2K e
1	 -K"(Sr + 2ro)	 3	 -K"Sr
+ 2K e	 - (2ro + 2K") a
	
(D60)
Sr
where it is implicitly assumed that r o s 2 .
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D3.5.3 Results. — For reference, all the parameters that will be used in presenting
the results of this analysis are defined as follows:
Ai
 = alarm rate
Ai
 = "unfavorable" alarm rate
Ar = aircraft wingspan
N = number of aircraft using the system
PA
 = probability of alarm
PA
 = probability of "unfavorable" alarm
PA/ PA = number of unfavorable alarms per alarm
Pr = probability of overlap
ro = alarm threshold
Sr = separation standard
Qr = standard deviation of aircraft navigation errors in the absence of
surveillance
vi
 = standard deviation of the aircraft drift rate
up
 = standard deviation of the surveillance errors
to
 = update interval (time between successive surveillance fixes per aircraft)
In presenting the results we have replaced the parameters P A
 and PA with two
more meaningful terms: (1) the alarm rate, A i, and (2) the ratio of unfavorable alarms
to total alarms. The latter parameter is simply equal to PA/PA . The alarm rate is
defined as follows:
NPA
	 alarmsA. _	 _	 (D61)
r	 to
	unit time
Likewise, the unfavorable alarm rate is
_	 NP	 P
Ar = to A = PA A r	 (D62)
The equations for PA , PA , and Pr developed in Sec. D3.5.2 along with the expression
for Ai (presented above) were evaluated parametrically on a digital computer. The results
are presented in graphical form in figs. D7 through D27. These curves may be used in a
variety of ways to perform tradeoffs between the various parameters. The applicable curves
are reproduced in Sec. 4.3.2 of this volume and were used in the specification of the ATC
surveillance system requirements.
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Figure D7.— SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM TRADEOFFS—ALARM THRESHOLD (ar = 2.5)
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Figure D8.— SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM TRADEOFFS—ALARM THRESHOLD (v = 5)
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Figure D9. -SURVEILLANCES YSTEM  TRADEOFFS—ALARM THRESHOLD (Q r = 7.5)
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Figure D10.— SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM TRADEOFFS—ALARM THRESHOLD (0^ = 10)
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Figure D11.— SURVEILLANCES YSTEM TRADEOFFS—ALARM THRESHOLD (Q r = 12)
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Figure D 13. —SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM TRADEOFFS—UPDATE INTERVALS x
DRIFT RATE (ro = 10)
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Figure D 14.— SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM TRADEOFFS—UPDATE INTERVALS x
DRIFT RATE (ro = 15)
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Figure D15.— SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM TRADEOFFS—UPDATE INTERVALS x
DRIFT RATE (ro = 20)
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Figure D17.— SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM TRADEOFFS—UPDATE INTERVALS x
DRIFT RATE (ro = 30)
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Figure D19.— SURVEILLANCES YSTEM TRADEOFFS—SURVEILLANCE ACCURACY
(Qr=2.5; ro=10, 20, and 30)
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Figure D20.— SURVEILLANCES YSTEM TRADEOFFS—SURVEILLANCE ACCURACY
(vr=5,- ro =5, 15, and 25)
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Figure D21.— SURVEILLANCES YSTEM TRADEOFFS—SURVEILLANCE ACCURACY
((7 r=5,- ro =10, 20, and 30)
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Figure 022.— SURVEILLANCES YSTEM TRADEOFFS—SURVEILLANCE ACCURACY
(ur=7. S ro =:5, 15, and 25)
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Figure D23. - SURVEILLANCES YSTEM TRADEOFFS-SUR VEIL LANCE ACCURACY
(or= 7.5; ro =10, 20, and 30)
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Figure D24.— SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM TRADEOFFS—SURVEIL LANCE ACCURACY
(Qr=10; ro=5, 15, and 25)
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Figure D25.— SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM TRADEOFFS—SURVEILLANCE ACCURACY
(ar=10; ro=10, 20, and 30)
146
10-2
Qa
laE103
0
a
E
y
0
D
10-4
10-5
-I I A- -	 t Ty AFU-^-f"4-	 __
_ -
-	
-
Q r =12N.Ml.
-
I 	 Lff	 I
-
t -t
25
4 =1.0
_ 
= 3.0 -
•ET
Tii^
_0.1
r{ ---	
=3.0 i =0.1
=1.0T_
=3.0•
 -
- - -
-	 - - _ -
Y ?	 Y 1^-_ —.	 _`tom-I ._
F -- -
0.5	 1.0
	
1.5	 2.0	 2.5
Surveillance accuracy, vµ , n.mi.
Figure 026. — SUR VEI L LANCE SYSTEM TRA DEO FFS—SUR VEI L LANCE ACCURACY
(Qr= I Z- ro =5, 15, and 25)
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